William J. Stephens: Some cases in point by Wasserman, Kenneth M.
University of Montana 
ScholarWorks at University of Montana 
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & 
Professional Papers Graduate School 
1995 
William J. Stephens: Some cases in point 
Kenneth M. Wasserman 
The University of Montana 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Wasserman, Kenneth M., "William J. Stephens: Some cases in point" (1995). Graduate Student Theses, 
Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 8772. 
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/8772 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of 
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an 
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu. 
i
M aureen  and M ike 
M A N SFIELD  L IB R A R Y
The University ofMontana
Permission is granted by the author to reproduce this material in its entirety, 
provided that tliis material is used for scholarly purposes and is properly cited 
in published works and repoits.
* *  Please check "Yes or “No “ and provide signaiure^''^'
Yes, I grant permission _^L.
No, I do not grant permission-----
Author’s Signatuf
Date; Y
conimercial pmposes or financial gain may be undeitakei 
hot’s explicit consent. ■
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
WILLIAM J. STEPHENS; SOME CASES IN POINT
by
Kenneth M. Wasserman
B. A. The University of California, Berkeley, 1970 
presented in partial ftilfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
Master of Arts
The University of Montana
1995
Approved by:
Chairman
ean, Graduate School
/
Date /
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
UMI Number: EP39573
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS  
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
UMI
O iss^ation  FHiWishing
UMI EP39573
Published by ProQuest LLC (2013). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition ©  ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
Pro.Q^st
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 4 8 1 0 6 -1 3 4 6
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
W asserman, Kenneth M., M.A., May, 1995. History
William J. Stephens; Some Cases in Point (104 pp.)
Advisor: Prof. Michael Mayer
This Master's Thesis analyzes the frontier legal practice of William J. Stephens, an 
attorney who practiced in Missoula County during the last third of the nineteenth century. 
The practice demonstrably reflected historical influences, including both primitive Anglo- 
Saxon practice as well as the more erudite teachings of the Inns of Court.
Bom in Ireland, Stephens came to America in time to experience the California gold 
msh. He spent a short time as a miner and as a merchant before taking up the practice of law 
in 1860. Stephens followed the mining camps, opening practices in Virginia City, Nevada, 
Idaho City Idaho, and Deer Lodge, Montana before settling in Missoula, Montana.
Missoula County litigation records reveal similarities between the cases Stephens 
handled and primitive Anglo-Saxon procedure. These include the use of oaths verifying the 
truthfulness of complaints and answers, an unvarying reliance upon pre-trial seizure of the 
subject matter, and jury trials. Excepting the last mentioned, these same factors distinguish 
frontier practice from modem practice. As to jury trials, frontier jurys had more latitude than 
modern ones.
Stephens handled numerous mining disputes, including matters within the purview of 
the so-called "miners' codes." Many suits were upon promissory notes, which were used as 
instruments of consumer credit and contract documents as well as evidences of ordinary 
borrowing. Many suits were brought upon the "common counts," further evidencing 
reluctance to employ attorneys as draftsmen. Torts to the person were rare, further 
distinguishing frontier practice from modern practice after the tort "revolution." The growth 
of the Town of Missoula in the 1880s is discernable from its litigation records, particularly 
after the arrival of the Northern Pacific Railroad, in the court cases become lengthier, more 
complex, more commercial, and concern greater dollar sums in issue.
While other commentators have striven to point out that, allowing for its more 
colorful vignettes, frontier lawyers demonstrated a degree a care and skill which would belie 
media impressions. This study takes that observation further. If the aim of litigation is fair, 
cost-efficient dispute resolution, then practice in frontier Missoula County was superior to 
modern practice.
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WILLIAM J. STEPHENS: SOME CASES IN POINT
Preface
This Master’s Thesis shall study the law practice of William J. Stephens, who practiced 
law in Missoula County, Montana, in the last third of the nineteenth century. The direction 
of its narrative will move from the general to the specific, from an outline of the broader 
influences of the law to a detailed description of these influences in the practice of one lawyer, 
in one frontier county, in one fragment of time. The choice of Missoula County stems simply 
from logistic convenience occasioned by the proximity of the Missoula County courthouse 
to the University of Montana. The choice of Stephens stems from his high level of litigious 
activity and his relentless character.
This "relentless" element of Stephen's character undoubtedly sprang from many 
sources. From what is known about his life, one can surmise that his mother's death during 
his own childbirth, a hearty upbringing in County Dublin, Ireland, and, what he described as 
liis early assumption of "life's responsibilities," forged a strong and resolute man. As a young 
man, his life intersected another influence: the Anglo-American common law. Through his 
career, Stephens became something more than another tough, resourceful, nineteenth century 
immigrant. Beyond being a lawyer, a court clerk, a state representative, and a judge, 
Stephens emerged as a true man of the law. Like so many others before and after him, 
Stephens adopted the patterned response to conflict which defines the lawyer, the relentless
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
dissection of human controversy into correlative rights and obligations. Stephen's practice 
provides an excellent opportunity to study a lawyer's real usefiilness to his clients. He almost 
never represented a fragmented body of shareholders. Stephens own friends and neighbors 
felt the impact of the results he obtained in and out of court. Like any lawyer, he had to face 
his clients' various accusers and tormentors; but he also had to face his clients. Since 
Stephens practiced in what was then a small, frontier community, his impact can be measured 
with particular clarity.
I would be remiss in my obligations if I failed to acknowledge the able assistance of 
Marcia Porter of the Records Management Department of the County of Missoula, as well 
as her staff, Betty Labelle, Kurt Fuchs, and Beth Sobolik. Each of these people bring an 
appreciation for the Western Montana's heritage to the efficient discharge of their duties. In 
another arena, William Jones, Esq., of the law firm of Garlington, Lohn, and Robinson, 
provided great encouragement and directional assistance. Mrs. Audra Broman of Missoula, 
Montana, who has accumulated a large body of information concerning early Missoula, 
graciously opened her files to me, thereby contributing to this effort. Mrs. Broman's records 
are the fruits of decades of patient compilation, and her efforts have been motivated solely by 
a love for history. I also have had the excellent good fortune to make the acquaintance of Ms. 
Heather Hawley of Seattle, Washington. Ms. Hawley is the great-great granddaughter of 
William J. Stephens. She assumed the duties of family historian and has tirelessly gathered, 
and graciously made available to me, important information concerning her family. This thesis 
would be much poorer without her assistance.
I am greatly indebted to Professors Linda Frey, Hayden Ausland, Richard Drake, and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Michael Mayer, each of the University of Montana. Each has taken an interest in my 
progress, provided encouragement, and personified the best standards of scholarship. Of 
these. Dr. Mayer deserves a special praise. He has served as my advisor, and has, without 
exaggeration, set a standard in that capacity. Additionally, he provided vital assistance with 
this thesis, in the form of invaluable advice, editing, and encouragement. Observing him, I 
have come to understand that my thesis, or that of any of his students', is also his contribution 
to the Department, the University, and to our accumulated heritage.
Lastly, I must thank my wife Melissa who, by example, serves as a continuous 
reminder that we daily preserve or diminish our civilization by the standards we set for 
ourselves.
It is hoped that my study of Stephens' cases provides some insight into the real world 
of frontier law, bringing to bear, as it does, my experience as a practicing attorney. In a larger 
sense, it is also hoped that this study helps to illuminate the functioning and the evolution of 
the legal process.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Introduction
Two forces pull the law in different directions. One is populist, for lack of a better 
word, and the other, also imperfectly labeled, is scientific. The populist thrust is the original 
legal impulse of the Anglo-Saxon people. This may be best described as custom. It originates 
from the common understandings and expectations of ordinary people. It articulates the 
common sense of the people.
The scientific thrust, on the other hand, originates in the perceptions of unusually 
astute minds. Far from articulating the common sense of the people, it expresses what 
ordinary people cannot see. This is the elitist tradition in the law. It presumes that long study 
of legal theory and interaction with the legal process produces a sensitivity that exceeds the 
boundaries of ordinary common sense. It also presumes to discover and formulate what 
ordinary people could not discover and formulate. This is the legal "science" of the Inns of 
Court of the fifteenth century, as well as the legal science of Christopher Columbus Landgell, 
and, especially, the judicial activism currently in vogue. It exceeds the modest pretensions 
of the common law judges to discover the law in the minds and hearts of the people; it 
searches for the law in the recesses of higher science. Unfortunately, this scientific law can 
only be found in the minds of other lawyers. That this higher science has discovered rights 
and obligations that common sense never imagined should embolden skeptics. It should also 
provoke a measure of modesty in legal community. Instead, however, the public’s 
bewilderment only confirms the legal profession's superior assurance.
The diverse social origins of nineteenth century lawyers fed the tensions between
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
custom and science. Historically lawyers came from the most privileged classes. This was 
true in late medieval England, as represented at the Inns of Court, and would remain largely 
true in early America. The nineteenth century, however, witnessed a widening of professional 
opportunity for persons of modest lineage. Abraham Lincoln, for example, used a law book 
and a candle to leverage himself into immortality. William J. Stephens also came from humble 
origins, and the study of law provided him with social prominence, public office, and a fortune 
in real estate. Like Lincoln, Stephens demonstrated sound business acumen in seeking his 
legal fortune on the frontier, where the distance between anonymity and community 
leadership was quite short. Trained in San Francisco, Stephens followed the prospectors to 
Western Montana, feverishly mined their disputes for legal business, and prudently spent his 
earnings on real estate and sound, adequately secured loans.
Differences in professional training and admission standards also promoted the gulf 
between custom and science. In Stephens' day, certification to practice was not predicated 
upon formal training. Missoula provided an excellent opportunity to study the quality of 
unschooled practice, its reactions to legal currents, and its value to an infant community. 
How did the people of Missoula, newcomers all, receive their early lawyers? While this 
question can never be answered with perfect accuracy, there is no doubt that, whatever their 
opinions, they rang their lawyers' doors with astonishing frequency.
To put Stephens' career into perspective, the first chapter discusses some of the 
historical influences which give dimension to a frontier practice. These forces cannot be 
adequately outlined if ancient forces are ignored. Legal historians agree that all modern 
institutions have older antecedents. However, most studies focus upon contemporary, or then
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
contemporary, factors, and ignore ancient origins. At the same time, a thesis centering upon 
the practice of a nineteenth century Missoula lawyer cannot also serve as a treatise covering 
two thousand years of legal history. Therefore, these brief remarks are confined to a few 
observations about Anglo-Saxon common law and the Inns of Court. The former represents 
the populist tradition, and the latter the elitist. Chapter 1 also presents a short discussion of 
American legal trends. The second chapter covers the life of William J. Stephens and the 
development of the town of Missoula.
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 treat the cases litigated by Stephens. Chapter 3, after briefly 
detailing some of Stephens' early appearances in Missoula County, discusses legal procedure 
in use in the 1870's. It focuses on highlighting continuities and discontinuities between the 
procedures in use in the Anglo-Saxon period, in frontier Missoula, and in modem practice. 
Chapter 4 studies the substantive causes of action themselves, allowing the claims to portray 
human interaction in a frontier society. Chapter 5 uses cases from the ensuing decade, the 
1880's, to demonstrate the evolution of Stephens' practice and the community of Missoula.
The types of cases presented and the incidentals appertaining to these cases 
demonstrate the usefulness of ordinary litigation records in portraying the life of a community. 
Litigation files present a uniquely incisive vantage from which to experience the real workings 
of daily life. These records provide a much more telling picture than other legal records, 
which tend to serve impersonally as evidence of statistical tendencies. They are more 
trustworthy than letters and reminiscences, which by necessity are random and 
unrepresentative. They are the closest thing we have to motion pictures; in fact, the images 
preserved in the files are more intimate than a camera can ordinarily capture. Furthermore,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the fact that lawyers cost money, while sad for the general public, is a boon for the historian. 
People do not bring idle chatter to a lawyer; they bring real controversies about real and 
immediate concerns. Human interaction distills itself into human controversy, and from 
controversy into litigation records. For all its posturing and abstraction, litigation possesses 
a wonderful sincerity.
Litigation is a process designed to facilitate the non-violent resolution of human 
conflicts. Every human community needs an orderly dispute resolution apparatus. Our 
system is, and always has been, the target of gibes to the effect that it unduly abstracts and 
complicates disputes. The cases and materials discussed in the following pages draw a picture 
of litigation that contrasts quite favorably with what we have today. Whatever the costs and 
frustrations faced by Stephens' clients, they at least had a system that was more about solving, 
and less about promoting, interpersonal disputes than what we have today.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter 1. Two Vectors
In part, American judicial proceedings trace to the periodic assemblies of the 
Germanic tribes. Meetings of the "hundreds," the earliest Germanic military and political 
divisions, date from before the Anglo-Saxon migration to England. They decided all 
controversies, assessed punishments, and collected dues; in short, they served as the entire 
judicial machinery.^ Anglo-Saxon immigrants brought these rude "courts," and the 
procedures associated with them, to England. In the course of these migrations entire 
communities came under the direction of their political leaders. Naturally, these migrants 
sought the comfort of their own customs as they became re-established in a new country.^ 
The "reeve," or, for the shire, scire-gerefa. or shire-reeve, or, finally, sheriff, presided 
over the meetings of the hundreds.^ It is the only Anglo-Saxon judicial office that survives 
in any format.'* The term reeve applied in both public and private contexts. Wealthy
*Max Radin, Handbook of Anglo-American Legal History. (St. Paul, Minnesota: West 
Publishing Co., 1936), 31.
Tienry Adams, "The Anglo-Saxon Courts of Law," reprinted in The Anglo-Saxon Law. 
(South Hackensack, New Jersey: Rothman Reprints, Inc.), 11. Originally published by Little, 
Brown, and Co., Boston, 1876.
^The relationship of the Shire to the hundred cannot be ascertained with certitude. 
Generally, however, the shire seems to have been a superior political entity, bearing the 
relationship to the more local hundreds that, later, a county court would bear to a justice 
court.
‘‘Russell Kirk, The Roots of American Order. (Washington DC.: Regnery Gateway, 1991), 
181.
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landowners had reeves who collected rents and dues from tenants, and otherwise preserved 
order on the estate. The term, therefore, connoted an officer vested with duly constituted 
authority. Of all the reeves, the scire-gerefa was the most prestigious; his power stemmed 
from the king's authority. Then, as now, the reeve of the hundred, or the sheriff, had little 
decision making authority. While the position survives to this day in policing districts, serving 
process, and executing judgements, the sheriffs participation was critical at all stages of civil 
proceedings in frontier Missoula County, to an extent that would surprise modern 
practitioners.
The civil procedure in use held to a simple outline. A contemporary of Stephens, 
Earnest Young, distinguished procedure in his time from the early German period. The 
procedure of his day, thought Young, should be likened to a syllogism, in which the body of 
judicial rules is the major, and the declaration of facts the minor premise. That description 
would satisfy any current practitioner as well. Continuing, Young argued that Germanic 
pleading was not syllogistic at all, just an unstructured demand for compensation.^ From 
there, ancient and modern litigants proceeded down divergent procedural paths of proof, 
which merged into substantially identical prayers for relief: both sought permission of the 
court to proceed to execution.*
^Ernest Young, "The Anglo-Saxon Legal Procedure," reprinted in The Anglo Saxon Law. 
(South Hackensack, New Jersey: Rothman Reprints, Inc., 1972), 3. Originally published by 
Little, Brown, and Co., Boston, 1876.
*The words "prayer" and "execution" are used here in their legal sense. A prayer is the 
portion of a complænt that specifies the relief requested. Execution, in civil procedure, is the 
process by which the relief ordered by the court is carried out, as, for example, the seizure 
and sale of the defendant's property to pay the judgement.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The gross distinctions, and the more subtle, yet profound, threads of continuity 
between those "divergent procedural paths of proof provide the most interesting comparison 
between ancient Anglo-Saxon law and the law of Missoula County. Whereas the courts of 
Missoula County viewed proofs in terms of modem conceptions of evidence, the Anglo- 
Saxon courts envisioned something quite different. Nineteenth century courts focused on the 
weight and veracity of testimony and documents (subject to supervening policy considerations 
which exclude certain types of evidence or evidence obtained under disfavored conditions). 
Anglo-Saxon courts, to the contrary gauged only the quality of oaths. The oath of an 
aristocrat had more probative value, de jure, than that of a yeoman. As a result, Anglo-Saxon 
evidentiary rules, unlike the rules of pleading, were actually more ritualized than modern ones.
The adduced proof was governed by severe formalistic strictures. Through the 
scheduling of oaths, according to Young, "the community, perhaps for the first time, placed 
their wills over the will of the individual."’ By that, he meant, the community began to 
resolve the dispute in lieu of the parties. The essence of the judgment answered the question 
of who should provide oaths, and what they must contain. This usually favored the 
defendant, for if he could provide the requisite oath or oaths, he prevailed. In an action on 
a debt, for example, the defendant needed only to provide, in effect, a sworn denial. The 
power of the proof lay in the fact that the denial was in the form of the oath. No facts were 
adduced to counter the plaintiffs claim. In an action for possession of movable property, the 
defendant had to provide, beyond a denial of wrongdoing, evidence of ownership.
The effortless administration of law in pre-conquest England was confounded by the
’Young, "The Anglo-Saxon Legal Procedure," 186.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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fact that cattle, a chief medium of exchange, tended to wander. A strict principle held that 
no title could be acquired in stolen property. Hence, more rigorous demands were imposed 
upon the parties. Upon the defendant’s denial, the plmntiff had to attest to his own good faith 
in bringing the action. In turn, the defendant's reply had to be accompanied by a pledge of 
security.* Some passages in written laws specified the quantity of pledge.^ These last two 
procedures were not only practiced in Missoula County, they were almost invariably relied 
upon.
After the Norman invasion, a more sophisticated brand of feudalism took hold, 
requiring a more sophisticated body of law for its administration. This required greater 
proficiency of those who practiced law. Therefore, lawyers formed into organized bodies to 
study the "law of the land," the common law of England. To convenience their studies, these 
lawyers acquired properties, the "Inns," a word which then signified a private mansion rather 
than a public accommodation.^® Little remains in the way of description of life in the Inns, or 
their curriculum, except to say that "the mode of instruction was principally readings and 
mootings.
Sir John Fortescue, nominal chancellor of Henry VI, threw some light on the picture,
*Ibid., 198-208. "A pledge of security" occurs where a party to a proceeding places 
property at the court's disposal to redress violation of an oath. Bail, to secure a criminal 
defendant's appearance, is such a pledge.
% . Munro Chadwick, Studies on Anglo-Saxon Institutions, (New York: Russell & 
Russell, 1905, 1963), 134.
^®John F. Dillon, The Laws and Jurisprudence of England and America. (New York: Da 
Capo Press, 1970), 42-3.
"Dillon, 52.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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particularly regarding the class of young men attended.
In these greater inns a student cannot well be maintained under eight and 
twenty pounds a year; and, if he have a servant to wait on him (as for the most 
part they have) the expence is proportionably more: for this reason, the 
students are sons to persons of quality; those of inferior rank not being able 
to bear the expences of maintaining and educating their children in this way .*̂
However, Wilfrid Prest's study demonstrated that the Inns did not limit attendance to
the sons of the aristocracy. Cost, not social ranking, barred the door. Prest concurred that
costs were imposing and included a fashionable wardrobe, fees to fencing masters and dancing
academies, and plenty of pocket money for gaming, drinking and plays. "[L]ike the proverbial
doors of the Ritz hotel," Prest said, "the Inns remained open to all sorts of men, rich and poor
alike, as long as they could foot the bill." In the end, the Inns were actually more exclusive
than the universities.^^
Wallace Notestein offered a fairly vivid impression of the curriculum. Although the
Inns did not mandate a set regime, "there were moots, bolts, imparlances, putting cases, and
readings." '̂* Of these, the moots elicited the greatest interest:
...their (the trainees) arguments were...criticized by older men, by Readers and 
Benchers, perhaps by the Serjeant-at-law, or by a great judge who happened 
to be in residence...Putting a case was a less formal procedure. As men were 
at dinner or supper one of the older men might put a case and draw out those 
at the table....Young men walking about the quadrangles were encouraged to
^^John Fortescue, De Laudibus Legum Angliae. (Cambridge, 1825), as quoted in A. 
Wigfall Green, The Inns of Court and Earlv English Drama. (London: Humphrey Milford, 
Oxford University Press, 1931), 33.
^^Wilfrid R. Prest, The Inns of Court under Elizabeth I and the Early Stuarts. (London: 
Hazell Watson & Viney Ltd, 1972), 27-32.
‘'‘Wallace Notestein, The English People on the Eve of Colonization. (New York: Harper 
& Brothers, 1954), 88.
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put cases to one another.. .Law, said Serjeant Maynard, was a babblative art; 
men should study all morning and talk all afternoon.
Roscoe Pound denied that the education at the Inns could be properly called "academic," (an
attribute he found commendable.) Neither professors nor jurists comprised the faculty.
Instead they were practicing lawyers, "in touch with the law in action, seeking to develop the
common law of England as a workable system for meeting concrete problems of adjusting
human relations and ordering conduct."*^
But just as the Inns produced the law itself, they also served as foundries of the
profession of law. Pound continues:
But what is significant for our present purpose is that the English lawyers at 
the end of the Middle Ages had become a well developed, well organized 
profession, maintaining a system of societies or associations promoting a 
professional tradition, providing adequate training of those who were to enter
^^Ibid., 88-89. Prest provides an example of an actual moot case, argued at the Middle 
Temple in 1612.
"[A man has] a bastard elder son and a younger daughter who is within age. The 
bastard dies having had issue. His father dies. The bastard's issue enters and grants a rent 
charge. The grantee distrains and has the return irreplevisable’. The bastard's issue dies, 
never having been interrupted in seisin. The daughter being within age, enters. The grantee 
of the rent charge distrains upon the daughter. The daughter makes a rescue and the grantee 
brings the assize.
The points;
1. Whether the issue of the bastard, being in without interruption, shall bar the woman who 
is within age.
2. If such a judgement, that is to say when the grantee has the return irreplevisable', amounts 
to a seisin upon which the other
can bring an assize." Prest, The Inns of Court. 108. (The question bears an eerie similarity 
to modern bar exam hypotheticals.)
^^Roscoe Pound, The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modem Times. (St. Paul: West Publishing 
Co., 1953), 92.
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the profession, and actively furnishing the development of the law/^
Thus, by the time the of the British colonization of North America, a wealthy, elitist, and self- 
contained legal profession had emerged/^
The Inns of Court made their impression upon colonial America. In the first instance, 
early American trained lawyers, such as William Livingston in New York, came 
predominantly from the Inns.^^ For a long time, training at the Inns of Court remained 
singularly prestigious. Virginia, having forbade the practice of law in 1645, by subsequent 
statute (Act 16 of 1656) regulated admission and specifically admitted barristers trained at the 
Inns of Court.^ In Maryland, membership in the Inns was the most prestigious entrance into 
the legal profession, and, hke Virginia, such membership exempted the member from entrance 
examination. Even Puritan Massachusetts saw three of its men journey to the Inns before 
1706.^  ̂ The Inns' influence seeped continuously into America's emergent legal community. 
Although lawyers took the lead in driving the colonies toward revolution, the Inns had served
^^Pound, 93.
**Prof Friedman says that "by 1600, English Lawyers were plainly professionals.. the bench 
was recruited from the bar...Lawyers and judges made up a single legal community, with a 
shared background and common experiences, as they do to this day. They were a cohesive 
group sharply set off from the public." Lawrence Friedman, The History of American Law. 
(New York; Simon and Schuster, 1973), 20.
^^Kermit L. Hall, The Magic Mirror: Law in American History. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1989), 22.
'"Pound, 137-8.
' ‘John Murrin, "The Legal Transformation: Bench and Bar of the Eighteenth Century 
Massachusetts," in Colonial America: Essays in Politics and Social Development. 3rd 
Edition, Stanley Katz and John M. Murrin, eds., (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1973), 
541-571, 549-50.
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to bind them to the mother country, holding the American elites to an English perspective. 
After all, the Inns did more than offer professional training. Focusing entirely, as they did, 
upon English legal institutions, English pleading, and English legal suppositions, they walled 
lawyers off from Roman law and the "continental legal culture.
Although the law of the Inns was English Common Law, it was certainly not common 
in the ordinary sense of the word. First and foremost, the law taught at the Inns was the law 
of land tenures (oddly, much the same law that tortures first year law students today). This 
law, therefore, applied to the landowning elite; so did the pages of Lord Coke's reports, the 
decisions studied by the law students. The venues of application were the royal central 
courts. This, then, was the law for "lords and ladies, landed gentry, high ranking clergymen, 
wealthy merchants...(t)he masses were hardly touched by this system.
For the rest of the people, the common law was the local, manorial law that governed 
their daily lives, that maintained and serviced the feudal hierarchy that stretched in a fixed, 
resplendent order from the child of the poorest tenant to God. The colonists imported this 
body of populist knowledge as well. It would be actualized in the daily workings of the 
justices of the peace, whom Kermit Hall has described as "the lowest and most ubiquitous 
layer of colonial legal institutions."^'* The justices themselves were usually lay persons, who 
applied common sense and community standards to the cases that came before them. 
Manuals such as Michael Dalton's Countrey Justice revealed how far this common law
^^Friedman, The History of American Law. 20. 
^^Friedman, The History of American Law, 21 
'̂‘Hall, The Magic Mirror. 20.
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departed, in expression as well as subject matter, from the deeply arcane common law of at 
the Inns.^* This populist tradition in American legal history has careened between humble 
admiration and bitter disdain for its elitist brother.
Colonial America, despite great expenditure and artful posturing, never developed a 
gentry that could rival England's. Still, such as did exist produced most of America's early 
lawyers. Seventeenth century "lawyers" in Maryland were actually well-to-do planters and 
merchants who dabbled in the law as occasion necessitated. When, after 1700, professional 
lawyers (that is, persons who maintained a regular, extensive practice which provided their 
principal means of support), began to appear in Maryland, they were drawn from these 
privileged groups.^ Similarly, Milton Klein's study of the New York Bar confirms that, while 
m earliest colonial times persons of common origins made up the rude practice, there would 
later be no clear line with which to divide merchants or landlords from lawyers. By the mid­
eighteenth century, the New York bar was controlled by men "organized to protect their 
professional interest." The bar association was able to monopolize practice by obtaining from 
the Supreme Court endorsement of its efforts to regulate admittance. In the years leading to 
the Revolution, law became the career choice of young men from the wealthiest families. 
Aspiring lawyers obtained a baccalaureate degree, which had become a prerequisite for a 
clerkship. There was, said Klein, "scarcely a prominent lawyer in the colony who was not
^^Michael Dalton, The Countrev Justice, reprinted in Stephen Botein, Early American Law 
and Society. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983), 99-102. Dalton had studied law at 
Lincoln's Inn in London (Botein, supra, 99 )
^^Alan Day, "Lawyers in Colonial Maryland 1660-1715," American Journal of Legal 
History, Vol XVII, No. 2, 145-165 (April 1973), 149.
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related by ties of blood or marriage to one of the great landed or mercantile families. By 
the Revolution, the profession in New York had achieved a separation from the community 
which was a "source of pride. Similarly, John Murrin's study of the colonial Massachusetts 
bar confirmed that by the 1750s, the sons of some of the leading Boston families chose a 
career in law.^ In 1762, Massachusetts Chief Justice Hutchinson ordered judges and lawyers 
to wear English robes and gowns (a similar requirement obtained in New York two years 
later).^ In fact, by 1750, in all major communities, "a competent professional bar, dominated 
by brilliant and successful lawyers...existed.
The emergent legal professionals flexed their muscles aggressively. Beyond 
representing clients, they made public policy. This was so, Robert Bell has argued, because 
the nature of the political process in American required their s k i l ls .A s  lawyers established 
public policy, they alone understood the intricacies of the law enacted to effect it. Lawyers 
became officeholders, community leaders, even celebrities. In any community, the complex 
issues were submitted to lawyers for solution, almost in the sense that eastern European
^^Milton Klein, "From Community to Status; The Legal Profession in Colonial New York," 
New YorkHistory; Ouarterlv Journal of the New York State Historical Association. (April, 
1979), 134-156, 148-150.
28Ibid, 156.
^^urrin , "The Legal Transformation: Bench and Bar of Eighteenth Century 
Massachusettes," 555.
‘̂̂ otein. Early American Law and Societv. 60.
^^Friedman, The History of American Law. 84.
^^obert R. Bell, The Philadelphia Lawyer: AHistorv 1735-1945. (London and Toronto: 
Associated University Presses, 1992), 170.
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Jewish communities relied upon rabbis. Somehow, like the Eastern European rabbis, the 
lawyers possessed a wisdom that transcended classification.^^ In some transcendent sense, 
they knew how things worked. As Alexis de Tocqueville observed in the early nineteenth 
century, "scarcely any political question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner 
or later, into a judicial question.
Daniel Boorstin contended that the law seemed "interfused" with everything else in 
the community and that "Americans saw the revered legal framework as the skeleton on 
which the community had grown. "^^This description bears a moment’s contemplation. The 
law had become so integral to society, so identified with the larger phenomenon called life, 
that, at least according to Boorstin, it actually seemed as though the community developed 
out of the law. What a stunning reversal! The entire theory underlying the presumed 
legitimacy of the common law was that it arose from common experience. Instead, by the 
post-Revolutionary period, the law had a life of its own. The law carried society forward, and
^^If this analogy seems excessive, consider some of the rhetoric discovered randomly in 
researching this paper; Bernard Schwartz called the Bar a "priestly tribe" fThe Law in 
America, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974); Daniel Boorstin called lawyers the "high priests" 
of the metaphysics of property (The Americans: The National Experience. New York: 
Random House, 1966, 416; Hall called the industrial lawyers of the post-civil war era "the 
'new high priests'" (The Magic Mirror, 225). Toqueville likened ante-bellum American 
lawyers to the "hierophants of Egypt" (Alexis De Toqueville, Democracv in America, vol. 1, 
289, edited by Philip Bradley, as quoted in George Dargo, Law in the New Republic. New 
York: Knopf, 1983, 57.) In our own era, the rhetoric is actually understated. Priests, after 
all, can only appeal to a higher authority. Modern lawyers are not expected to look beyond 
themselves in solving perceived social ills.
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol. 1, edited by Phillip Bradley, as 
quoted in Hall, 86.
^TJaniel Boorstin, The Americans: the Colonial Experience. (New York: Vintage Books, 
1958), 204-5.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
20
not the other way around. The implications for the status of lawyers were great. Lawyers, 
in the democratic era, became the "highest political class and the most cultivated portion of 
society.
The implications for society, however, were far greater. If lawyers had assumed such 
status and power, then, conversely, the other segments of society had correspondingly 
diminished. As lawyers became the bones and not the flesh, to follow the metaphor, what 
check could be placed upon them, what, besides self-discipline, could moderate their impact? 
Fortunately, the greater community had one established line of defense: its historic mistrust 
of lawyers.
Boorstin says that the anti-lawyer feeling gained renewed strength in early colonial 
America. In New England, puritan immigrants sought a legal system bound tightly to 
scripture and freed of the complexity of the common law. In Maryland, the Act of 1674 
stated that "the good people of this province are much burthened by lawyers." Until 1673, 
there was no right to practice law in Massachusetts. Pennsylvania legislated simplicity in 
pleading, a body blow to the development of a legal community. As the profession became 
more established, "(l)awyers, like shopkeepers, moneylenders, and lower bureaucrats (were) 
lightening rods that draw rage during storms in the polity. Rioters in New Jersey in 1769
^̂ Democracy in America, tran. Henry Reeve (2 Vols., Vintage ed., 1959), vol. 1, 288. 
^^Boorstin, The Americans: the Colonial Experience. 197.
^*Friedman, The History of American Law. 83.
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published pamphlets urging resistance to "this unconscionable set of L—yers. But Boorstin
noted a corresponding phenomena; respect for the law rose along with distrust of lawyers
Writing on the colonial bar in New York, Milton Klein noted the
juxtaposition of conflicting themes: the bar's gradual rise to political and social 
importance, paralleled by, and indeed resulting from, its increasing technical 
competence, along with a steady growth in hostility from the laity
Boorstin's analysis separated law from lawyers. He saw the public as legally literate, and
therefore able to admire law but not lawyers. While the argument contained its own internal
logic, it was not very persuasive. It failed to explain Klein's observation that the profession
gained social prominence as it accrued public mistrust. The real reason for the parallel rise
in prestige and hostility was that the public both feared and respected the lawyers' secret trove
of knowledge. Like advanced military technology, the public feared and wanted it, the mix
varying against a changing social background.
The profession's prestige plunged after the Revolutionary War, manifesting lingering
anti-English attitudes. Lawyers were attacked during Shay's Rebellion and later, under the
influence of Jacksonian Democracy, as elitist and anti-democratic. During lean times, lawyers
were collected debts for impatient creditors and so became the point of attack for angry
debtors. The bar's ubiquitous bag of legal technicalities was always the greatest irritant. "I
give my decisions on principles of common justice and honesty between man and man, and
^^erived from an anonymous broadside entitled "Liberty and Property Without 
Oppression," as printed in Botein, Early American Law and Society. 124-126.
'‘“Boorstin, The Americans: the Colonial Experience, 205.
'“Martin Klein, "The Rise of the Legal Profession in New York," New York History. 
April, 1979, 134-156, 137.
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rely on natural bom sense and not on law learning," said David Crockett, "I have never read 
a page in a law book in my life.'"*̂  No one could have said it better. Maxwell Bloomfield has 
insisted that antilawyer sentiment before the civil war was a middle-class phenomena as well. 
Merchants resented the high costs of litigation as their demand for legal services increased 
with the growth of the business economy."*  ̂ According to Robert Bell, the ante-bellum 
community in Philadelphia sensed a "conflict of interest" in the fact that the profession which 
made the laws also profited from them.'*'*
Lawyers countered with a barrage of propaganda designed to generate appreciation 
of the legal profession. Publications sought to portray lawyers as hard-working, self-made, 
even altruistic. In place of the aloof charlatan, legal publications drew an image of the 
dedicated intellectual, the conscience of society.'*  ̂ By the civil war, the legal profession was 
broadly respected. Something more than propaganda accounted for this improvement in the 
public image of lawyers; the profession had become more representative of the society at 
large.
Kermit Hall noted a trend toward social diversity as the nineteenth century wore on. 
In the early years, the bar was "inbred," composed primarily of the sons of prominent families.
"^Quoted in Bell, The Philadelphia Lawyer. 91.
'‘̂ Maxwell Bloomfield, American Lawyers in a Changing Society. 1776-1876. (Cambridge 
Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 1976), 44, 138,
'*'*Bell, The Philadelphia Lawyer. A History 1735-1945. 63. As the recipient of an M.S. 
in Taxation, I would venture the hope that the public will soon extend greater confidence to 
this perception.
'•^Bloomfield, 144-147.
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By the Jacksonian era, however, entry restrictions had been eased and the bar experienced 
greater middle class representation. "Diversity in the bar," Prof. Hall said, "was a by-product 
of urbanization and industrialization.W hile not directly attacking the democratization of 
the bar. Pound traced efforts to ease admission standards to fear of legal elitism and the 
Jacksonian faith in the "natural right of every man to pursue any calling of his choice." 
Additionally, and for Pound, quite dangerously, the nineteenth century pioneer ethos 
celebrated versatility and deplored specialization. As a result, "the legal profession was 
retarded and warped by the frontier spirit...(leaving) a mark upon our law and procedure 
which we have been striving hard to erase in our present cen tu ry .Fr iedm an ,  echoing 
Boorstin's theme, said that "the doors to the profession were at all times relatively open." 
Moreover, "(t)he bar became a great avenue of social advancement" and the "vehicle through 
which poor man's sons sometimes reached wealth and position. The result was a stratified 
bar. The young lawyer with lucrative connections had a shorter path to financial security. 
As the century wore on, that path detoured through a law school.
Formal legal education had existed in the United States since the eighteenth century. 
American law schools had developed organically out of law office instruction, as some 
practitioners realized that a living could be obtained exclusively from taking in apprentices
'“Kermit Hall, The Magic Mirror. 216. Prof Hall takes care to point out that in the South 
the law remained insular until "well into the twentieth century."
'‘’Pound, The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modem Times. 223.
'‘*Pound, The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times. 237.
‘Friedman, The History of American Law. 266-7.
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under a relatively formalized regime. George Dargo identified some thirty-five law schools 
which came into existence before 1835, most carrying the name of the attomey-founder .̂ ® 
Law school education took its present shape after 1870, when Christopher Columbus 
Langdell became Dean o f the Harvard Law School. Langdell initiated the case method of 
study. Briefly, instead of listening passively to lectures, students were socratically grilled on 
the contents o f selected cases. The underlying theory compelled more interest than the 
method. Students were not being taught the tools of a vocation, they were being encouraged 
to investigate the "science of law." Langdell's method implied, and his casebooks expressed, 
the idea that the law was an accumulating body of scientific knowledge distilled from human 
controversies, and stored in case reports. A central by-product was the enhancement of the 
stature of lawyers trained in the law schools. After all, students trained in the case method 
were men of science. Langdell's methods greatly cleaved the divisions in an already stratified 
profession.®^
Langdell's law replicated the law of the Inns. Dry, erudite, logical, it existed above 
the push and pull of ordinary life. His methods produced learned opponents like Pound, 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and more recently, Morton Horwitz. Lawyers trained in the case 
method differed appreciably from the lawyers trained more traditionally by apprenticeship. 
This latter method, called generally "reading the law," consisted of copying out pleadings for, 
and (ideally) under the supervision of a practicing lawyer. Additionally, such lawyers read
®“George Dargo, Law in the New Republic: Private Law and the Public Estate (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1983), 51.
‘̂Maxwell Bloomfield, The American Lawyer in a Changing Societv. 347; Jonathan Lurie, 
Law and the Nation: 1865-1910 (New York: Random House, Inc., 1980), 64-5.
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legal treatises to obtain a general overview of legal principles. The purpose of such study was 
not to perfect an appreciation of legal science. It taught lawyers how to get a defrauded 
farmer's money back. In the place of science, logic, and erudition, there was form, procedure, 
and result.
As with lawyers trained at the Inns in colonial times, lawyers trained in the case 
method possessed the mantle of authority. They occupied the elite wing of the profession. 
Their practices changed in ways that reflected changes occurring generally in industrialized 
America. Lawyers became more officebound and administrative. At the same time the 
apprenticed lawyers disdained the treasure of impractical knowledge gained at the law 
schools. As the elite bar specialized, the non-elite lawyers remained generalists. Giving 
ground grudgingly, they took their strongest stand in the frontier regions of the nation.
E. Lee Shepard, in an article concerning new law practices in ante-bellum Virginia, 
pointed out that a small clique of attorneys controlled the most profitable legal business. 
The same could (and can) be said for the rest of America. The more established lawyers 
tended to congregate in commercial centers as, obviously, they still do. For the young lawyer 
without impressive family connections, or, at least, an intimidating diploma, the frontier had 
always provided the happiest hunting grounds. The frontier bar was educated "in the 
courtroom, in the local inn, and by Blackstone."^^ Friedman describes its personnel as "quick-
Lee Shepard, "Breaking into the Profession; Establishing a Law Practice in Ante- 
Bellum Virginia," Journal of Southern History. Vol.48; No. 3, (August, 1982), 393-410, 407.
^Gordon Morris Bakken, Practicing Law in Frontier California. (Lincoln and London: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1991), 22.
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witted adventurous young operators.
Tending as they do toward over-simplifications, such a picturesque descriptions may 
obscure as much as they illuminate. Still, there are generalizations which are serviceable. By 
and large, frontier practice was trial practice. Debt collection and quieting titles were the 
chief stock in trade. Once an attorney had accumulated an arsenal of forms, he seldom 
needed legal research, as that term is understood today. A grasp of the subtler, intangible 
nuances of legal science was virtually useless. On the other hand, a quick wit and an engaging 
oratorical style were powerful instruments. The client's case proceeded farther along the road 
to victory when supported by a reference to popular literature, or the classics, or the Bible, 
than by a case citation. This should not suggest that frontier lawyers were hucksters. No one 
who actually studies the work product of frontier lawyers can fail to appreciate the sheer legal 
skill they brought to bear upon the cases they presented, or their knowledge of and adherence 
to procedure.
Among the young lawyers who set out from an urban center in post-bellum 
America was William J. Stephens, of County Dublin, Ireland, by way of San Francisco, 
California. He went to a frontier community where social connections were unimportant and 
where the competition was thin. There, in Missoula, Montana, he personified and 
encountered all of the influences which have been thus far catalogued.
*"*Friedman, 144.
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Chapter 2. William J. Stephens
Anyone seeking to write a biography of a minor actor in history must confront the 
paucity of sources and materials. This is especially true of William J. Stephens, who operated 
in the American West during the frontier period. Concerning Stephens, and other peripheral 
figures in Montana history, the main published sources, apart from newspaper stories, are a 
series of "who's who" style compilations published in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. The editors of these books would solicit biographical material from notable 
Montanans, who, in turn, would provide the same in conjunction with money for the purchase 
of the book. Thus, the editor obtained his profit. The contributor received primarily the 
satisfaction of seeing his name and life story (and, for a larger fee, his picture or likeness) in 
print. Apart fi"om the ego gratification, appearance in one of these compilations was probably 
good advertising, particularly in a state like Montana which had no indigenous aristocracy, 
or, even, many native bom (white) residents. It goes without saying that the material 
published in these books failed to meet the most modest test of critical historiography. Each 
short biography was the writer's best impression of his own life, and nothing more. Still, if 
some of the glowing phraseology is ignored, a body o f index information remains which in 
most cases is reliable.
William J. Stephens appeared in three of these collections. He was introduced as an 
"attomey-at-law, and ex-Judge of Probate, County Clerk, and Recorder of Missoula County" 
in History of Montana^^ as the "distinguished citizen and honored pioneer" in Progressive
^̂Histoiy o f Montana. 1739-1885. (Chicago: Warmer, Beers & Company, 1888), 1318.
27
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Men of the State of Montana^^: and as "a prominent member of the bar" in The State of 
Montana” . Other sources also mention Stephens, a truly accomplished and respected 
attorney in Missoula County.*®
William J. Stephens was bom at Kingston, County Dublin, Ireland, on May 30, 1834. 
His mother died during the birth. Stephens had three brothers and no sisters; at least he 
mentioned none in any account he gave. He identified his father as Henry A. Stephens, whose 
fatherly skiUs the younger Stephens did not describe ”  Stephens did assert that he had "early 
assumed the responsibilities of life."®" He attended public schools until he was thirteen years 
old, at which time he went to sea. According to Progressive Men of Montana, he arrived in 
the United States in 1847 and lived in Baltimore, Maryland until he learned of the gold strike 
in northern California. He sailed out of Baltimore on a merchantman, around Cape Horn, and
^̂ Progressive Men of the State of Montana. (Chicago: A. W. Bowen & Co., 1910), 1254-
5.
”Joaquin Miller, The State of Montana. (Chicago: The Lewis Publishing Co., 1894), 323-
4.
*®I received a body of documentation from Heather Hawley, Stephens' great-great 
granddaughter, including interviews with her grandfather James Russell Hawley, bom 1902, 
(Stephens' grandson through his daughter Eleanor) who, while still a boy, met Stephens. 
Heather Hawley also provided me with an interview with her great-aunt Phyllis Turner (also 
a suriving grandaughter of Stephens), and the written recollection of her other great-aunt, 
Hope Hawley Ketcham (deceased) dated October 30, 1986. For convenience, the 
aforementioned writted recollection is referred to as the"Ketcham recollection."
*^Stephens' Death Certificate names his father as "Edwin Stephens" (Washington State 
Board of Health, Bureau of Vital Statistics, Certificate of Death Registered No. 4488.) As 
Stephens provided the information to Progressive Men of Montana. I have selected that 
account. Mrs. Margaret Stephens, Stephens' second wife, provided the Death Certificate 
particulars.
"̂Progressive Men of Montana. 1254.
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arrived in San Francisco in July of 1850. He wasted only a few days in that city before 
proceeding to the gold fields in the State's interior. After trying his hand as a miner for ten 
days, he worked as a clerk in the general store of Curtis & Chase on the Tuolumne River for 
one year, after which he engaged in placer mining for eighteen months, and accumulated 
about $2,000.00 for the effort.®̂  Stephens did not live the archetypal miner's life. Instead of 
spending each day's take on hellraising, he invested his earnings in a grocery store in a 
Tuolumne County mining town called Poverty Hill, where he worked for five years. 
Heckendom & Wilson's 1856 directoiy describes Poverty Hill as follows:
This camp is situated five miles south from Sonora, in Tuolumne Co. 
and adjacent to Campo Seco. It was first settled in 1850, by Wm. Utter, from 
whom it first derived its name. It was subsequently changed to its present 
name.
The camp is noted for its surface diggings which were formerly very 
extensive...It consists of some five or six stores, and about thirty or forty 
dwelling houses. There are also quite a number of families settled in the 
vicinity.^^
Stephens gave no reason why he thereafter returned to San Francisco, but he did say that "he 
began to study law under Judge Townsend.
The Ketcham recollection varied somewhat fi’om that account. Hope Ketcham agreed
®^The information that he spent eighteen months mining at the general store on the 
Tuolumne River, and one year thereafter in mining is from Miller's The State of Montana. 
This information varied fi*om that given in Progressive Men of Montana, which identified the 
periods as one year in the general store and two years, thereafter, in mining. The Miller 
account was published eight years earlier than Progressive Men of Montana. Because the 
earlier account was closer in time to the actual events, I have relied on it for these particulars.
"Miners & Business Mens Directory for the Year Commencing January 1st, 1856", 
Heckendom & Wilson, 87.
63Progressive Men of Montana. 1254.
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that Stephens, whom she called "James," (Stephens' middle name) was bom in Dublin, but 
added that his parents were English, who, moreover, were "upper class educated people."^ 
Ketcham confirms that he left home at thirteen years of age and took to the sea, but by her 
account he headed for the Sandwich (Hawaiian) Islands.®* She said he sailed the South Seas 
for three years, and, although loving the seaman's life, reflected, gravely one might presume, 
upon "the class of people who made up the crews" He determined to "get a job and go back 
to school.,(h)e knew he was going to be a mental man." So he left the ship in San Francisco. 
Hope Ketcham's account indicated that he worked days and studied nights, inferentially in San 
Francisco, becoming a lawyer in five years. She largely discounted his presence in the miners' 
world, saying only that he "spent some time, it was short, at the California Gold field."
Hope Ketcham's impulse to recall her grandfather more readily as a hard working law 
student, and less readily as a miner, is easily forgiven. But the accounts given the "Who's 
who" publications during Stephens life must be credited. Additionally, extant documentation 
attests to Stephens' presence in the fields upon an established basis. In 1850, Stephens
®‘An index of Irish names attributes several possible origins to the name Stephens, 
including "planter English." This would support Ketcham's theory. Edward MacLysaght, 
The Surnames of Ireland. Sixth Ed. (Dublin; Irish Academic Press, 1985), 279.
®*Very tangential and unintended support for the notion that Stephens arrived from Hawaii 
or the South Seas was provided in the doctoral dissertation written by Raymond August. 
Seeking to demonstrate that the law of the mining camps was Spanish in origin, August traced 
the dissemination of news of the strike at Sutter's Mill in order to determine the origin of the 
earliest prospectors who arrived from outside of California. These were mostly Hispanic 
(especially Chilean and Mexican), but the news did reach Hawaii on June 18, 1848, nearly six 
months after the discovery, but well in advance of the awakening in the Eastern United States. 
The news trickled out slowly because crews in San Francisco deserted for the American River 
area. Raymond August, Law in the American West: A History of its Origins and its 
Dissemination. (PhD Dissertation, University of Idaho, 1987), 198.
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identified himself to A. W. Tuckett, the United States census taker, as a eighteen year old 
"Miner".^ The "Miners (sic) and Business MEN’S DIRECTORY," published by Heckendom 
and Wilson in 1856, contained a roster of residents of Tuolumne and other counties. The 
Poverty Hill Directory identified "Stephens, W. J , Merchant, Ireland. The 1860 Census 
found Stephens in the Jamestown postal zone of Tuolumne County, having "variety store" as 
an occupation, possessing $200.00 worth of real estate and $1,000.00 worth of personal 
property. He had a clerk working for him named Lyman Mason.^*
By his own account, Stephens remained in Townsend’s office until 1861. From there 
he went to another mining town, Virginia City, Nevada, where he continued to study law in 
the office of Quint & Hardy (presumably fellow Irishmen) until 1864, at which time he was 
admitted to the Nevada State Bar.®̂  Stephens practiced briefly in Nevada and in 1865 moved
®®United States Census, Township N-2, Tuolumne County, California. Curiously, the 
document is dated April 30, 1856. Stephens would have been sixteen in 1850, and, of course, 
twenty-two in 1856. Teenagers on their own are apt to exaggerate their age.
’̂Heckendom & Wilson, p. 88.
^®United States Census, Township No. 3, Tuolumne County, 1860. Jamestown was 
apparently named after a Col. George Frederick James, who was the camp's "alcalde," a 
Spanish administrative post held over for a time while American jurisdiction took hold. James 
won the affection o f his neighbors by his "generosity with liquid refreshment" and his 
gentlemanly ways. He was also an attorney who traveled the environs with a beautiful, young 
Mexican lady he always called "la senora," together with a servant who dispensed cash. He 
lived opulently, affecting the manners and dress of a Mexican hidalgo. However, James 
proposed a joint venture with his neighbors which went broke. He left Jamestown in a hurray 
for San Francisco. Carlo M. De Ferrari, "Summary Justice, The Way it Was, A short 
Account of the Gold Rush Alcaldes of Tuolumne County," (Senora, California: CHISPA 
The Quarterly of the Tuolumne County Historical Society, Vol. 32, No. 3, Jan.-Mar. 1993), 
1093-1112, 1094.
^^Stephens probably met Quint in Tuolumne County. Leander Quint appeared in the 1860 
Federal Census for Tuolumne County as a Lawyer, claiming real estate valued at $9,000.00
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on to Idaho City, Idaho, where he practiced for about a year. Stephens thus had hitched his 
star firmly both to fi-ontier and to mining towns. By this time, the center of prospecting action 
had shifted to the what later became the State of Montana.
No one knows precisely when gold was discovered within the present jurisdiction of 
Montana. The missionary. Father Pierre De Smet, apparently knew of the existence of gold 
as early as the mid-1840's. Fearing disaster for his Indian converts, however, he kept the 
knowledge to himself. In the late 1850s there were several minor discoveries. By the early 
1860s, the fields in California, Nevada, Colorado, and Idaho were spoken for or spent; but 
there existed, nonetheless, a large, seasoned, nomadic tribe o f American miners fascinated by 
every rumor. In 1862, in response to a series of important discoveries (especially at Bannack 
in July), the Montana rush got underway.™ More important for this story, mining had begun 
in earnest along Gold Creek. This deposit was located about sixty miles east of present day 
Missoula, near the important Mullan Road, which connected ports on the Missouri and 
Columbia Rivers. About twenty miles west of the Gold Creek site was another mining town, 
Beartown, to which Stephens came in May of 1866.’^
and personal property worth $15,000.00. A history of the county disclosed that he eventually 
moved to San Francisco, where he "gained a large practice and achieved honors." A History 
of Tuolumne County. (San Francisco: B. F. Alley, 1882), 377.
™See Merrill G. Burlingham, "The Mining Frontier in Montana," in The Montana Past: An 
Anthologv. edited by Michael P. Malone and Richard B Roeder, (Missoula: University of 
Montana Press, 1969), 61-87; Michael P. Malone, Richard B Roeder, and William L. Lang, 
Mnntana: A Historv of Two Centuries. Revised Ed. (Seattle and London: University of 
Washington Press, 1976, 1991), 64,65.
’*The Ketcham recollection had Stephens going directly from San Francisco to Montana: 
"I do not ever remember hearing what made him decide to take his knowledge of law and 
horse to Montana but he did. Riding horseback from S.F to Billings I believe."
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Stephens stayed a year in Beartown, and from there removed about thirty miles
southeast (along the Mullan Road) to the town of Deer Lodge. In the February 1, 1868
edition of The Weekly Independent. Stephens advertised his services as an attorney:
"W. J Stephens
Attorney at Law.
Deer Lodge City, Montana
Will practice in all Courts of the Territory'
He remained in Deer Lodge for three years. During his second year there, he won election
as District Attorney of the Second Judicial District, which comprised Beaver Head, Deer
Lodge, and Missoula c o u n t i e s . I n  that capacity, he obtained the first convictions for first
degree murder in the history of area which would become Montana. In 1869 he married Miss
Emma H. Lebeau, a native of St. Louis, Missouri. Ketcham related the meeting as follows:
James was practicing law at or near Deer Lodge, and had some business with 
a Mr Thibault. So he rode out to Mr Thibault's house one beautiful spring day 
morning. In those rather primitive days most people went to the main door 
o f the house which was the kitchen door. Arriving at the door he beheld a girl 
on her hands and knees scrubbing a wood floor with a strong scrubbrush 
singing! She having her back to the door knew nothing of his approach, she 
kept on singing. So he stood there for quite a few minutes watching her and 
finally said to himself "that's the girl I'm going to marry. " He had settled it in 
his heart before she ever knew he existed!
The Lebeau, or Thibault, or Tebeau, family had a colorful history. The family had come to
^̂ The Weeklv Independent (Deer Lodge, Montana), February, 1, 1868, p. 1.
^ În 1868, Stephens, running as a Democrat, defeated Republican Clitus Barbour in the 
election for District Attorney. Stephens polled 1,381 votes to Barbour's 996. Historv of 
Montana. 553. In 1869, Stephens again defeated Barbour, this time by a count of 1788 to 
1370. Historv of Montana. 831.
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Montana from St. Louis. According to Heather Hawley (Stephens' great-great- 
granddaughter), Emma's ancestors included a Parisian locksmith who came to Kaskaskia, 
Illinois (a defunct community formerly located near St. Louis) after disembarking in New 
Orleans in the 1720's’ .̂ Another ancestor was a Spanish merchant who arrived in St. Louis, 
then undeer Spanish jurisdiction, in the 1770's. The St. Louis Genealogical Society has 
published a roster of the Spanish militia of St. Louis in 1780. Members included Joseph 
Alverez Hortiz, Emma's maternal great-grandfather.^* The same society also published an 
index of Catholic marriages in St. Louis between 1774 and 1840. This identifies four Hortiz 
marriages, the earliest being the aforementioned Joseph Hortiz' marriage to Marguerite 
Bequet on February 1, 1780. The marriage of Joseph Thibault on April 10, 1804 is noted, 
as is the September 14, 1833 marriage of Henry Thibault to Adeline Hortiz.’® Emma was the 
issue of the latter union. For these reasons, Ms. Hawley believes Emma's family name was 
Thibault.
The June 19, 1868 edition of The Weekly Independent good- naturedly reported
Stephens' marriage.
For some time past, a young man firom Deer Lodge has been prowling around 
this section of country. What his business was no one could tell, but things 
looked suspicious—something was wrong, but what it was no one could tell 
until last Wednesday, when one o f the most daring robberies was perpetrated
’^Letter from Heather Hawley to Kenneth M. Wasserman dated January 26,1995.
’*"The Revolution in the Environs of St. Louis," published for the "Spirit o f '76 Fair," (St. 
Louis: St. Louis Genealogical Society, 1972).
Catholic Marriages of St. Louis, Missouri 1774-1840", (St. Louis: St. Louis
Genealogical Society). Microfiche by the Genealogical Department of the Church of Jesus 
Christ o f Latter-Day Saints, G.S. Call# 6048074.
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that it has ever been my duty to record. The invader has captured and will 
carry off one of Missoula's fair daughters. I allude to the marriage of W. J. 
Stephens Esq. to Miss Emma Lebeau, which took place at the residence of the 
bride's father in Grass Valley.. ."Thad" stood the trying ordeal like a martyr.
No doubt his friends at Deer Lodge will be pleased to know that he was well 
attended to, and that we endeavored to make his last hours as comfortable as 
we possibly could. After supper was over, dancing commenced, and was kept 
up without intermission until the light in the east warned us to desist.. .We 
have concluded to let "Thaddeus" off, but if any more of you Deer Lodgers 
attempt to run the blockade,—well, I won't say what we will do, tho' some of 
the boys say they will retaliate. Hope they may.’’
Mrs. Stephens proved to be talented as well as fair. In 1877, at the Second Annual 
Fair of the Western Montana Agricultural, Mineral and Mechanical Association, she took 
prizes for the best "specimen hand tatting," and best "white bed spread," together with a 
special prize for the "prettiest baby."’*
Stephens was the junior member of the firm of Thornton, Robinson & Stephens when, 
in 1870, the firm's office burned down, destroying its valuable library. Sensing opportunity 
to the west in the grovdng community of Missoula, Stephens and his bride moved there in 
December of that year.’^
The town of Missoula originated in a manner typical o f many Western towns. Frank 
Worden, a native of Vermont, came to the Northwest where, in 1856 he became a clerk in 
the Indian Department in the Washington Territory. He opened a general store in Walla 
Walla with a Mr. Isaacs, who subsequently sold his interest to Christopher Higgins. Worden
77 'Thff Weeklv Independent. (Deer Lodge, Montana), June 19, 1868, p. 3.
Missoulian. October 19, 1877. Ms Hawley states that hand tatting is "a difficult 
type of needlework...a cross between crocheting and lacemaking" (letter, January 26, 1995).
History of Montana states; "W. J. Stephens came to Missoula and put out his shingle 
in the fall o f 1870" (p. 860.) The December date is from Miller.
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knew the bureaucratic ropes in the Indian Department, and so he and Higgins obtained a 
permit to trade with the Flathead Indians in what was then Washington Territory, later 
Western Montana. In August of 1860, the two men, together with a pack train of seventy-six 
animals bearing merchandise, reached the Missoula Valley. They selected a site about four 
miles west of the current downtown, between the Indian reservations to the north in the Jocko 
Valley, and the Bitterroot Valley to the south. Additionally, the site was near the Mullan 
road, handy for all east-west travelers needing provisions or refreshment. Earlier in the year, 
men from Mullan's company had petitioned the Washington Territorial government for the 
creation of a new county, since it took two days to ride to the county seat (Spokane County) 
in Colville. In December, the territorial government created Missoula County, with the 
County seat located at Higgins' and Worden's trading post. In the following fall
(1861), gold mining activity increased along Gold Creek, and by the spring o f 1862, there 
were plenty of new customers for the trading post owned by Higgins, Worden, and, by then, 
Frank Woody. The settlement surrounding the trading post was called "Hellgate." The 
discovery of gold in the Kootenai mines to the northwest in 1864 brought more customers 
through Hellgate. In November of 1864, Higgins, Worden, and David Pattee built a sawmill 
at the convergence of Rattlesnake Creek and the Clark Fork River; a flour mill followed the 
next spring. In fall 1865, Higgins and Worden moved the Hellgate store close to their mills, 
and next door to the property where W. J. Stephens would commence practicing in Missoula 
a few years later. The re-location of the store killed the small settlement at Hellgate; but just 
as surely, it gave birth to the town of Missoula. Another gold strike in 1865, this time on the 
Little and Big Blackfoot Rivers, intensified traffic through the settlement. On December 26,
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1865, Granville Stuart drew a sketch of the town, revealing thirteen structures.*” By 1869,
there were fifty structures "including a flour mill, two stores, two large hotels, two blacksmith
shops, two livery stables, a billiard room, sawmill, post office and several saloons."** On July
9, 1870, Episcopal Bishop Daniel Tuttle came to Missoula and wrote; "In Missoula and all
other towns, only the world, the flesh and the devil with many helps [sic] and the Holy Spirit,
unhelped are at work."*^ A month after Stephens' arrived, the town plot was drawn up, and
the town was officially surveyed.
Attorney Stephens hit the ground running. If he actually did take up residence on
December, 1870, then only a couple of weeks passed before his first advertisement appeared
on January 5, 1871 in the Missoula and Cedar Creek Pioneer.*̂  The Town of Missoula was
quite proud of its new resident:
We are pleased to state that Mr. W. J. Stephens, recently of Deer lodge City, 
will hereafter practice his profession and become a permanent resident, in our 
midst. Such additions to our community speak more for the future of our 
town than columns of newspaper inducement. Mr. Stephens has resided in 
Deer Lodge county since 1866. In his public capacity, as Prosecuting 
Attorney of that County for several years, as well as in all the private relations 
o f life, this gentlemen has made himself universally respected and esteemed.
Indeed, his record is so well known to our citizens, that it is superfluous to 
say more than merely allude to his intention of locating in Missoula.*'*
*”Along the bottom of the sketch, Stuart wrote: "Sketched in 12 inches of snow. 
Thermometer 34 below zero, hence not well finished."
**Lenora Koelbel, Missoula the Wav It Was (Missoula: Gateway Publishing & Litho, 
1972)33.
*"Koelbel, 35.
" The Missoula and Cedar Creek Pioneer. January 5, 1871, p. 1.
" The Missoula and Cedar Creek Pioneer. December 29, 1870; p. 3.
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Upon completion o f the new courthouse in June, 1871, the town held a ball celebrating the 
dedication. Reporting upon the event. The Missoula and Cedar Creek Pioneer identified the 
notable attendees, including "the madonna-like Mrs. W. J. Stephens and other ladies of the 
elite of Missoula society."**
Mrs. Stephens' new found celebrity was not diflBcult to understand. Her husband later 
reported to Progressive Men of Montana that he had found in Missoula "a large and valuable 
clientage."*^ Stephens' account to Miller's The State of Montana afBrmed that "there was a 
great deal o f legal business over land and mining claims," and that "from his arrival in 
(Missoula) Judge Stephens enjoyed a large and remunerative practice."*’ Further evidence 
of Stephens' success appeared in the May 25, 1872 edition of the Pioneer, which reported that 
Stephens was building a home:
Mr. W. J. Stephens is putting up a substantial residence about one mile below 
town and informs us that he has a nice lot of fruit trees on the premises which 
are growing finely. Have you got a watermelon patch? Them's our kind of 
fruit.*®
Stephens was not alone—Montana was booming.
Stout's Montana,,Jts Story and Biographv has this to say about legal practice in 
Montana during this period:
**The Missoula Pioneer. June 22, 1871, p. 3.
*̂ Progressive Men of Montana. 1255.
*’Miller, 323,
**The Pioneer. May 25, 1872, p. 3. The phrase "below town" meant to the west, i.e. down 
river.
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But though the fees were large, the lawyers, seemed to think the supply 
inexhaustible....For the number of people in the territory the litigation was 
very large, owing to the disputes and conflicts concerning mining claims and 
the appropriation of water; and it is not too much to say that the bar o f this 
period was equal to that of any other country. Notwithstanding the expense 
and difficulties of transportation, they had fine libraries, and when occasion 
required would ship large numbers of books at the rate of twenty-five cents 
per pound to remote countries, to be used there in the trial of cases.*®
The same account went on to describe the business before the Montana Territorial Supreme
Court during the terms of August, 1871 and 1872. After describing the cases and decisions
during the latter term, the text proudly praised the skills of certain lawyers:
It is said that "the briefs and arguments of counsel at that term, for 
learning and ability, have never been surpassed in the territory or State of 
Montana, and would have added dignity and strength to any bar in the 
country; and if the opinions and decisions of the judges were not sound and 
able, the fault was not with such lawyers as E. W. Toole, W. F. Sanders, 
Claggett and Dixon, Sharpe and Napton, Chumasero and Chadwick, Joseph 
K. Toole, Shoper and Lowry, Henry N. Blake, Samuel Word, James G.
Spratt, Henry L. Warren, George G. Symes, W. E. Cullen, W. J. Stephens and 
United States District Attorney Cornelius Hedges." (emphasis added)®^
Notwithstanding Stephens billing near the bottom of the list, his mention among the elite
lawyers of the territory strongly inferred that his legal skills were well regarded. In a few
short years, Stephens would be able to add minor military honor to his growing reputation.
During the summer of 1877, Missoula was threatened during the Nez Perces War. 
With the nearest telegraph 60 miles away in Deer Lodge, Missoulians had little warning that 
Chiefs Joseph, Looking Glass and White Bird, along with eight hundred followers were
*®Stout, Montana Its Story and Biographv. (Chicago and New York: The American 
Historical Society, 1921) 421.
^Ibid., 421-2. The internal quotation is not attributed.
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heading up the Bitterroot Valley, southwest of Missoula. A company was organized to 
defend the town, and Stephens was designated Lieutenant. On about July 25 news came that 
an advance guard of Chief Joseph's band had reached Lolo. By this time, the white military 
strength, including the company from Missoula, had grown to about five hundred men. The 
Missoula contingent included about forty regulars from Fort Missoula. After Chief Joseph 
passed within three-quarters of a mile of the contingent's entrenchments, he turned up the 
spur of a mountain and thereby avoided a skirmish. The white companies moved as well, and 
when they arrived at the Bitterroot, the soldiers and volunteers from outside the area went 
home, to the dismay of the Bitterroot settlers, who were still in danger. There was, according 
to Amos Buck, "one exception" to the shameful dispersal: "Judge W. J. Stephens came on 
up the valley with us and remained with us until he found that no harm was to come to us 
from the Indians we had been out to fight. Stephens star continued to rise. In 1878
he was a candidate for clerk and probate judge and was elected to the county Democratic 
central committee. In 1883 he was elected County Clerk and ex-ofFicio Probate Judge. That 
year, Mrs. Stephens obtained notoriety in her own right.
According to the newspaper account, Stephens worked late on the night of Thursday, 
April 18, 1883. Around midnight, Emma Stephens, at home with the children, heard someone 
attempting to enter the house. When Emma warned the intruder, he gave a mocking reply 
and continued trying the doors and, even, the windows of the house. Thoroughly alarmed, 
and knowing one entrance was not secured, Emma blindly fired two guns through the
^^Amos Buck, "Review of the Battle of the Big Hole", Contributions to the Historical 
Qnqptv of Montana. Vol. 7 (Helena: Montana Historical and Miscellaneous Library, 1910), 
117-120.
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window. She heard no more, and concluded that she had succeeded in frightening the 
trespasser off the grounds. The next morning, the hired man informed her that a dead man 
lay at the back gate.
The dead man was Jonnie Baker. He had arrived in Missoula on the 17th of April, and 
had stabled two horses with C F. Ledge & Co. The Missoula paper said he was a "hardened 
sinner" who had been "ordered out of Deer Lodge not a great while ago. " The coroner's jury 
quickly found that the homicide was justifiable.^^ By 1884, Stephens' official duties, 
together with the demands of his practice, led him to form a partnership with a young attorney 
named William M. Bickford. Stephens' business ventures and investments grew apace. By 
1887 he and Bickford, now collaborating in real estate ventures as well, had purchased sizable 
blocks of property south of the river. They planned to found a new city. South Missoula, for 
which they plotted streets running parallel to the wagon road to the Bitterroot. The wagon 
road ran southwest, thus South Missoula's streets ran diagonally to the section lines. Judge 
Hiram Knowles last minute maneuvers effectively checkmated Stephens' plan, but the streets 
he proposed exist today, a half mile square island of streets running diagonally to those in the 
rest of the city. Even longterm residents find the zone baffling.^  ̂ Stephens and Bickford took 
on another partner, Frank Higgins (Christopher Higgins' son) in 1887. By then, Stephens’ 
other business interests had taken over his attention, and he retired in 1889.
He continued to appear in the city directory advertisements place by Stephens, Matts, 
and Denny (a law firm), but just below that ad, his own appeared, as follows:
92TbA Weeklv Missoulian. April 20, 1883, p. 3. 
«Koelbel, 68.
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W. J. STEPHENS,
MISSOULA, - - MONTANA.
I make land entries of all kinds.
I keep correct plats of Government Lands.
I loan money on final proofs made at my office.
I loan money on improved farms.
Borrowers can get their money on the very day they apply.
I keep abstracts of title to all real property.®"*
In retirement, Stephens enjoyed the financial benefits accruing naturally from a 
productive life. Unfortunately, as his career wound down, his marriage to Emma was 
imploding. On June 3, 1894, he filed for divorce, alleging that his wife had deserted him the 
previous May, and further alleging (presumably in support of his request for custody of the 
three children who were still minors) bizarre, violent behavior on the part of his wife. The 
court appointed a referee to take testimony and report. The referee was Elmer Hershey, a 
partner in Bickford's new firm. Hershey took sworn testimony on August 14 and 15 of 1894. 
After her attorney filed an unsuccessful demurrer, Emma did not again appear. Stephens, and 
five of his children, however, did. The five were four of the adults, the other adult child being 
married and in Seattle. Adeline, a fifteen year old minor, also testified. From each account, 
Emma, the same "Madonna" who graced the ball commemorating the new courthouse in 
1871, emerged as a dangerously dysfunctional adult.
^̂ Wrisht & Woodward's Missoula Citv Directory, 1890, p. 231.
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Stephens testified that his wife had twice attempted to leave him before effecting the 
final break. In 1890, he took her to the West Coast in an attempt to revive the marriage.^^ 
The trip, he concluded, made matters worse. They returned on the last day of 1891, and took 
of residence in the Florence Hotel. Emma's spirits continued to decline, and she began 
demanding money with which to leave him. She began consorting with a woman possessed 
of a shabby reputation and refused to desist. To no avail, Stephens urged her to allow him 
to build a new house for the family. She said that "if I [Stephens] had a spark o f manhood 
I wouldn't want to live with a woman who hated me."
In May of 1893, Emma abandoned the Hotel and went to live in Seattle with the three 
minor children. Stephens made two trips to urge her return. During the second, in the spring 
of 1894, the children were allowed to select the parent with whom they preferred to live. 
Stephens returned in May with the three minors and filed shortly thereafter.
He testified to disturbing incidents in she which attacked him with deadly implements 
("she rushed in like a maniac with a carpenter's hammer , and aimed a blow at my head"), 
cursed him frequently, and spat in his face during the most minor disagreements. Stephens 
denied marital relations ("cohabiting") over a period of years. Referring to Alice Marguerite 
Stephens, born May 27, 1890, Emma suggested the child was not his.
Harry A. Stephens, the twenty-six year old eldest son, confirmed his father's version, 
including the violence, the abusive language, and the absence of provocation. Asked by 
Hershey which of his parents was best fitted to care for the minor children, Harry replied "the
®*The file in another matter, Stephens v. Conant, Case No. 180, reveals that they had gone 
to California.
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plaintiff is. Defendant often treated the minor children cruelly without cause."
Adeline Stephens, aged fifteen, confirmed the desertion, and added that, while in 
Seattle, Emma had introduced her to a "young man" as her sister. Laura Buckley, the parties' 
twenty-four year old married daughter, also confirmed the desertion. She told how Emma 
had, "fully a hundred times," said she hated Stephens, and that she "did not want an old man 
like plaintiff tagging after her." Laura confirmed the spousal abuse, saying that Emma had 
an uncontrollable temper, and indulged in rages during which she actually "would foam at the 
mouth" (Stephens testified to the same phenomena). Laura continued, saying that Emma 
"scoffs at religion...She has said just because one was married to one man is no reason why 
one must be true to him." Lastly, she related a singularly bizarre incident in which Emma 
invited her daughter Eleanor's fiance into the bathroom while Eleanor was bathing.
Nineteen year old Alexander Stephens also confirmed Stephens' account. Hershey 
asked him; "Is it more than probable that a young child would suffer physically from 
defendant's temper?" Alex replied: "With her temper it would be more than probable that 
they would get knocked down with a club." Lawrence Stephens also testified on behalf of 
his father.^ Hershey's report stated that Emma was not "a fit or suitable person to have the 
care and custody of said minor children." The Court, not surprisingly, granted the divorce 
and awarded custody to Stephens.
^̂ W J. Stephens vs. Emma H. Stephens. Case No, 1066.
’̂The Ketcham recollection is much kinder to Emma. She is there described as a 
fastidiously neat woman, affectionate with her granddaughter, the writer. Still, "grandma's 
temper" rates numerous anecdotes.
In February of 1995, Stephens great-great granddaughter. Heather Hawley, conducted 
tape recorded interviews with two of Stephens' surviving grandchildren, James Hawley and
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Emma Stephens remained in Seattle. On February 21, 1898 she married Michael 
Andrew Reid, who was identified as a "mariner" in the Seattle phone directory of 1918. The 
family lore includes the story that while Stephens and Emma were in California in 1890, in an 
effort to resuscitate the marriage, they took a voyage. Reid was the Captain. Emma heard 
his voice and fell instantly in love.^* The 1930 Directory identified Reid as a janitor. The 
Ketcham recollection indicates that Emma's (or "Aimee") second marriage was happier than 
her first. She died in the early 1930's.
For the reminder of his career, Stephens managed his investments and engaged in the 
land business. In 1896, he sued Bickford over the disposition of profits from their law and 
real estate businesses. This was his lowest hour. He accused Bickford of failing to account 
and misappropriating partnership funds. Like the Stephens divorce, this case was assigned 
to a Referee Although represented, Stephens conducted most of the examination of Bickford 
by himself. Stephens mean-spiritedly badgered his former protege about minor affairs. Aside 
fi'om some minuscule inadvertences, however, he failed to establish any serious wrongdoing. 
The Referee found for Bickford.^
Phyllis Turner. Both are the issue of Stephens' daughter Eleanor. Phyllis Turner echoed 
Ketcham's description of a hellcat with a soft heart; "I was scared to death of her.. .When they 
[Emma and her second husband Michael Reid] would come [we would ask] may we take 
your coat' [and Emma would reply] T'll take my coat off when I get good and ready'. . .but she 
would always say to Mr. Reid give the girls a dime.'" James Hawley had only positive 
memories. Emma knew her grandson's affection for french fries, and "always had a pot of 
deep fat on the back of the stove ready to go" when, as a boy, he visited.
Ms. Phyllis Turner remarked that "Mr. Reid worked for the Alaska Steamship 
Company" and that he, Reid, "did have a nice, soft, resonant voice. " Interview with Heather 
Hawley, February, 1995.
J Stephens vs. Walter Bickford. Case No. 1291.
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Stephens served as Missoula's Democratic representative in the Fifth Legislative
Session of the Montana House of Representatives (January 4 to March 4, 1897) and the Sixth
Legislative Assembly, (January 2 to March 2, 1899)^^. In Polks 1903-4 city directory,
Stephens appeared as "President of the Missoula County Abstract Co. and attorney at law."
In the 1911 directory, the listing for Stephens specified only his address ("Apt D The
Bowland"), omitting any reference to any vocation. The 1915-16 directoiy included the
following; "Stephens Wm J, moved to Los Angeles, Calif.
The Ketcham recollection is the only source for his later years (excluding his death
certificate and death notices). A granddaughter's memories, it focuses upon his personal
rather than his professional life. It stated that:
Grampa lived single for years after the divorce...finally in old age he caught 
pneumonia ...his doctors advised him to go to Calif...(h)e loved Santa Anna 
[sic] so at his doctors [sic] advice took one of the nurses with him...
Suddenly, he appeared, together with the nurse, at his daughter Eleanor's home in Seattle.*”̂
He took up residence at the Calhune Hotel. His other daughter, (Alice) Marguerite, visited
him a few days later and learned that he had married the nurse. According to Marguerite, as
relayed by Hope Ketcham, the nurse threatened to leave Stephens if he did not marry her,
saying that otherwise her reputation would be ruined. Something else was ruined instead: the
“̂“Ellis Waldrom, Montana Legislators 1864-1979. Profiles and biographical Directory 
(Missoula: Bureau of Government Research, University of Montana, 1980), 139.
' “'R L Polk & Co^SLMissoula and Hamilton City Directory and Missoula and Ravalli 
Coiintv Director/ 1903-4 (Helena: R L Polk & Co.), 198; Polk Directory for 1911, p. 282; 
Polk Directory for 
1915-16, p.245.
“̂̂ The nurse's name was Margaret, not to be confused with Stephens' daughter Marguerite.
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expectations of Stephens' heirs.
Shortly after, he fell ill again. Marguerite visited and, again, according to Marguerite
as relayed in Hope Ketcham's recollection, Stephens suggested that his bride was poisoning
him. Then he quickly recanted, admitting a suspicious nature. "Well," Ketcham said, "two
days later he was dead."̂ **̂  Moreover,
I and the rest of the family were too dumb to be suspicious for quite a long 
time. But when we learned that in the 3 months of their marriage she had 
converted over all of his property into other property , trades and sales, she 
purchased a large block in the Olympic Hotel place, two other very good 
hotels here in Seattle & sold the tide flat acreage, everything except on the 
copper mine in Montana which he had purchased as a working mine and 
closed to be sure to leave at least that to his children...
The family, all branches were so poor those days and copper so cheap Mom 
& her sisters and brother just let her get away with it. They said, to fight it 
was throwing money away on a very uncertain future.
Something of Stephens' legal acumen had remained in the family.
Stephens died June 5, 1918 at his home at 943 Twenty-fourth Avenue, in Seattle,
survived by his wife Margaret, and eight children.
Stephens place in Montana history is peripheral, but his memory is esteemed by his
family. James Hawley, his grandson, recalled that Stephens was a "prominent man, highly
‘“Ketcham recollection. Phyllis Turner heard the rumors as a girl; "he did write a letter 
to somebody saying he was being poisoned. He was afraid he was being poisoned by the 
nurse that was taking care of him...he was sure he was being poisoned." James Hawley was 
disdainful when reminded of Ketcham's accusation: "Sounds like my sister putting the worst 
possible interpretation on
the motives...It seems to me a perfectly logical sequence that some woman who took good 
care o f him and fulfilled his needs in his old age [might be entitled to the inheritance]." 
(Interviews conducted by Heather Hawley)
lo-'Thm Seattle Post-Intelligencer. June 6, 1918.
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respected." Phyllis Turner, a granddaughter, recalled that as a young girl she had been "quite 
in awe of the fact that my mother's father was a judge.
"I had always heard," said Heather Hawley, Stephens great-great granddaughter, "that 
one o f my ancestors was a Judge in frontier Montana—he was always spoken of with 
respect.
That seems only fair enough.
^^^Interviews conducted by Heather Hawley.
“̂̂ Letter from Heather Hawley to Kenneth M. Wasserman, February 27, 1995.
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Chapter 3. The Early Practice: A Procedural Focus
The first impression of Stephens' practice is that it parallels the assessments made of
some of the more notable frontier lawyers, such as Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, and
Abraham Lincoln. Freink Dewey, also a lawyer, did an analysis of Jefferson's eight year legal
career and concluded that, while a colonial Virginia lawyer might draw an occasional deed
or will, "being a lawyer in those days meant being a trial lawyer. Similarly, James W. Ely,
Jr.'s study of Andrew Jackson's practice confirms that "Jackson devoted most of his time to
trial work . .[0]ffice work, such as drafting deeds and wills, was seemingly not a major
activity for Jackson. John P. Frank said of Lincoln:
At all times, Lincoln was first and foremost a trial and appellate lawyer. His 
was not the business of incorporating banks or railroads, or drafting contracts, 
or arranging sales of property. He was a litigation man.^^
The sheer volume of Stephens' court work strongly infers that litigation occupied the bulk of
his time.
In the first book of the Register of Civil Actions, Second District, Stephens appeared 
in fully 201 of the 456 actions filed between 1868 and 1878.^^“ Before moving to Missoula,
“̂̂ Frank L Dewey, Thomas Jefferson. Lawyer (Charlottesville: University Press of 
Virginia, 1986), 1.
James W. Ely, Jr., "The Legal Practice of Andrew Jackson" Tennessee Historical 
Quarterly. 421-435, 430.
“̂̂ John P. Frank, Lincoln as a Lawyer (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961), 6.
“ ®The word "appear" may seem over used in the text, but as it has a specialized legal 
meaning it is the proper word. When a lawyer "appears," he has formally undertaken a client's 
representation in a specific (court) case. A lawyer usually appears initially by signing an initial
4 9
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he appeared in 9 of the 72 actions filed before December of 1870; afterwards he appeared in 
198 out o f384—an astonishing 51.6%. And clients had many lawyers from which to chose.
This chapter presents a procedural analysis of the law practiced in Missoula County 
in the 1870s. Where appropriate, it will reflect upon procedural differences and similarities 
between practice in frontier Missoula and Anglo-Saxon practice, and between frontier 
Missoula and current practice.
Stephens had litigated in Nflssoula County prior to moving there. His first appearance 
was as co-counsel with Joseph Rand on behalf of The Territory of Montana and the County 
of Missoula vs. The Hudson Bay Company. The Territory and the County contended that the 
defendant had done business outside of the Flathead Indian Reservation without a license, 
which the defendant denied. On October 2, 1867 Stephens and Rand filed a replication to the 
defendant’s answer, and, concurrently, a Motion to Strike Out a Portion of Defendant's 
Answer.“  ̂ Functioning as "W. J. Stephens District Attorney Second Judicial District," he 
prosecuted Charles Cuissin and Janice Gugwaith for adultery on behalf of the Territory."^ 
On the eighteenth of October 1868 he appeared alone on behalf of Defendant A. H. Tebeau,
pleading.
“ 1̂, 289. Reference is to transcript and page number, respectively, of the Register of Civil 
Actions of Missoula County. A "replication" is a reply to an answer. Briefly, a
lawsuit begins with the presentation of a grievance in the proper form. This is formally called 
the "complaint." The party sued, the defendant, files a written response, usually a refijtation 
called an "answer." Occasionally, the complaining party responds to the answer, in a 
document called a replication.
"21, 313-4.
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denying that "Said (L. J. Demers) plaintiff is entitled to the possession of nineteen milch cows 
or Sixteen Calves Known as the Jack Demers Calfes or four milk Buckets or Sixty milk pans 
or either or any of the above chattels," and alleging affirmatively that his client's possession 
was lawful, resulting fi'om "an agreement entered into between plaintiff and defendant on the 
5th day of April 1868. " The case was settled and dismissed upon the plaintiffs payment of 
$67.00 in costs. When W. J. McCormick sued David Driscol for "11 oz. 2(?) and 6 Grns 
of merchantable gold at $18 per ounce ...for flour sold and delivered to defl. at his Special 
instance and request," Thornton, Robinson & Stephens appeared for Driscol on June 14, 
1869. Driscol's counsel specifically denied McCormick’s claim, affirmatively alleged failure 
of consideration ("said flour was not good or merchantable or of the quality represented"), 
cross-claimed for labor performed, and, finally, alleged that the plaintiff was not the real party 
in interest. W. J. Stephens duly witnessed Driscol's mark, "X", enabling Driscol to verify 
the answer.
Thornton, Robinson & Stephens also represented Defendant O. W. Squires, filing 
their initial pleading December 14, 1868.“  ̂ This was the law firm Stephens would later 
identify as the one he left when their office burned down, and thenceforth went to Missoula.
*'^1,405-10. There is reason to believe that Stephens was representing one of his in-laws 
in this matter. See pages 35-36.
“ '‘An answer to a complaint almost invariably serves to deny the plaintiffs grievance. If, 
as often happens, the defendant not only denies the complaint but also alleges some fact in 
his or her favor (in this example that the flour purchased was of unacceptable quality), that 
allegation is called an "affirmative allegation," because it is more than a mere denial.
“ M, 548-550.
"^1, 579-82.
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Stephens last case in Missoula County, while still residing in Deer Lodge County, was in his 
capacity o f District Attorney for the Second Judicial District. In it, he represented the 
Territory against Jane Kirkham and B. Kirkham. One M. B. Harris had been arrested for 
assault with intent to kill, and had made and jumped bail; the case Stephens prosecuted in 
Missoula was against the two Kirkhams as sureties on the bail bond.‘^̂  The People of the 
Territory of Montana were in good hands, at least when wrongdoers ventured into the 
Second District.
While the above cases provide solid amusement, containing as they do a travelogue 
of local color surrounding litigation on the American frontier, those cases and the ones 
following also provide a compelling picture of the legal procedure then in use. Though it is 
surprising to see an unrelated cross-claim inserted between a substantive and a procedural 
affirmative defense in the same pleading, a modem lawyer would find none of the procedures 
employed by Stephens' abstruse or even unfam iliar.M oreover, if the procedures employed 
by W. J Stephens and his contemporaries anticipated those of the late twentieth century, it 
is also fair to point out that they reflected shadows cast in King Alfred's day, and before.
The first, glaring facet of nineteenth century procedure that reflected ancient Anglo-
" " 1, 711 - 13 .
"*See the Driscol case, above.
A "cross-claim" is a subsequent complaint entered in a lawsuit. For example, a 
defendant may have a grievance against the plaintiff, or a related grievance against a third 
party. These would be plead as a "cross-complaint." A modern practitioner would have filed 
Driscoll's answer, which would include any affirmative defenses, in one document, and the 
cross-complaint (usually filed concurrently with the answer), in another.
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Saxon law was the use of verified pleadings."’ As described in Chapter 1, the early Anglo-
Saxon defendant, duly summoned, entered his denial under a rigorous oath. The plaintiff
countered with an oath of his own. In Stephens' Missoula County, all pleadings were verified
before a notary public. The format of the verification was nearly identical to that used in
modem courts, for example:
Territory of Montana 
County of Missoula
Philippe Reuss
being first duly sworn deposes and says that he is the plaintiff in the above 
entitled Cause that he has heard read the foregoing complaint and knows the 
contents thereof and that the same is true of his own knowledge except as to 
the matters therein stated on information and belief and as to those matters he 
believes it to be true.'^’
The answer was also sworn. Stephens often verified pleadings on behalf of his clients,
declaring "that he is the atty of Defendant in the above Cause that he (Stephens) has heard
read the foregoing answer...and that he has reason to believe that the matters therein stated
are true."'"
Modem lawyers, under more proscribed circumstances, may also verify pleadings on 
behalf o f a client, but are extremely reluctant to do so, having a sharper eye towards their 
professional liability. More important, verified pleadings are nowadays required only in 
extraordinaiy causes, such as pleas for injunctive relief, and expedited matters such as
" ’A "verified pleading" is a complaint or answer to which is affixed the party's sworn 
declaration that the alleged facts are true. Thus, where a complaint or answer which has been 
verified contains an alleged fact which the party knows, or reasonably should know, is false, 
that party is liable for perjuiy.
'^2, 116.
*^'See, for example, 3, 309-10, L ew  vs. Shav.
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unlawful detainer.L aw yers now prefer to avoid verifications in the pleading stage because 
they do not want to tie their clients to one set or description of the facts; rather, they wish to 
preserve as much room to maneuver as possible for as long as possible. True, legal 
proceedings were less under God's nose in Stephens' day than in Alfred's; evidence, not oaths, 
constituted the real essence of litigation. At the same time, the survival of the oath at the 
pleading stage in Stephens' time, and its demise in our own, indicates that lawsuits are now 
easier to commence, and that the truth is now less of a barrier to nonmeritorious suits.
Another similarity between the litigation format practiced by Stephens and the pre­
conquest Anglo-Saxons is the imposition o f prejudgment remedies. In modem litigation, 
prejudgment attachment (court ordered seizure of the subject matter of the suit before 
judgment) is a form of extraordinary relief. It is "extraordinary" because the court orders a 
seizure of the property in question before there has been a trial. Obviously, such a procedure 
offends ordinary notions of due process—the defendant has his property seized by the sheriff 
before he has even had a trial, let alone lost the case. The plaintiff must make a strong 
showing of necessity for immediate seizure, beyond mere entitlement to possession. The 
plaintiff must show, for instance, that the defendant is about to secrete the property in issue, 
or dispose of it, or abandon the jurisdiction.
In Stephens' day, however, the plaintiffs counsel routinely obtained a writ of 
attachment concurrently with the issuance of the summons. Moreover, there was no separate 
hearing on the attachment, merely an affidavit and a surety bond. The affidavit had requisite
such cases, the courts must make relatively rapid determinations affecting rights and 
property; therefore the danger inherent in frivolous allegations is exponentially greater.
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elements: that the claim was upon a contract for the payment of money, that no security had
been provided, and that the attachment was not sought to vex legitimate creditors of the
defendant (that is, the attachment was not part of a collusive scheme between the plaintiff and
defendant). For instance, when Joseph Lamoureaux sued Clement Lamoureaux, claiming an
indebtedness of $949.08, Stephens, representing Lamoureaux, applied for a writ by affidavit
dated July 13, 1871 alleging that the debt was
upon an express or implied contract for the direct payment of money in the 
Territory of Montana...(for which) payment has not been secured by any 
mortgage or lien or pledge upon any real or personal property that it is a 
bonafide existing debt due and owing from the defendants to this plaintiff that 
this action is not brought nor is the prosecution of attachment sought to 
hinder or delay or defraud any creditor or creditors of the defendants.
In another case, the plaintiffs, T. J. Demers and Wm. McWhirk executed a surety
bond, declaring themselves to be "jointly bound to the defendants in the above entitled cause
in the sum of $1894.16/100 Dollars to the payment of which sum will and truly to be made
bind ourselves our heirs executors administrators and assigns jointly [sic]..." should defendant
be damaged by the attachment and prevail, and that each affiant was worth the sum of the
bond.^ '̂* The next day Judge Hiram Knowles issued a Writ of Attachment, filled in upon a
preprinted form, confirming that "the necessary affidavit and undertaking herein having been
filed as required by law" and commanding the sheriff to "attach and safely keep" nonexempt
property belonging to the defendants "unless the defendant give you security, by the
^ ^ 2 , 1010 .
^^^hese bonds are still required in these circumstances, and for the same reasons. Since 
the defendant is being dispossessed before trial, he has a right to compensated for losses 
occasioned by the attachment should the attachment subsequently be proven to have been 
unwarranted.
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undertaking of at least two sufficient sureties, in an amount sufficient to satisfy such 
demand. The SheriflF, R. A. Pelkey, returned the Writ on July 17, 1871, confirming that 
he had "posted notice of attachment" on mining claims 13, 18, 19 20, and 21 in the Barrett 
District, and requesting fees therefore in the amount of $6.25.
Attachments were sometimes flawed. In Boneher and Telefir vs David O'Brian et.
Stephens moved for discharge of the attachment, alleging that the sureties were not in the 
territory, that the undertaking had been filed ten months prior to the issuance of the Writ, and 
that the "affidavit does not pretend to show that the demand is on an express contract for the 
direct payment of money. In another case, W.R. Post vs. William Stevens (no relation), 
Stephens, representing Post, had obtained an attachment. The defendant thereafter sought 
release of the property, requiring Stephens, on June 10, 1872, to bring a motion to "stay the 
issue o f an order for the release of any property levied upon for the plaintiff. ..the Deft not 
having given a bond as required by law."*^* The just described sequences reflect modern 
procedure for prejudgment attachment, including the defendant's right to preserve possession 
by bond.*^  ̂ Because of the distance in time, however, the similarity to Anglo-Saxon
’̂ ^Note that the plaintiffs bond was for twice the amount of the claim.
1010-18.
‘̂ ’3, 0429-30. There is no record of the result of Stephens' motion.
1̂ ^,06 1 3 .
^^^ontana's statutes concerning prejudgment attachment, contained in Title 27, chapter 
18 of the Montana Code Annotated, are typical. Title 27-18-101 provides: "Cases in which 
property may be attached.(l) Property may be attached in: (a) An action upon a contract, 
express or implied, for the direct payment of money where the contract: (i) is not secured by 
any mortgage or lien upon real property; or (ii) is originally secured and such security has,
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procedures is far more striking. As mentioned above, in Anglo-Saxon possessory disputes 
where title was unclear, the plaintiff had to assert good faith, as Joseph Lemoureaux, above, 
did, and the defendant had to pledge security, which Stevens failed to do.
The most important Anglo-Saxon influence was also the most obvious: the jury. The 
Anglo-Saxon "popular assembly, parliament, law-court, and army in one" (see footnote 4) 
decided all judicial disputes. The magistrate, the shire-reeve, was more of a sergeant-at-arms 
and a master of ceremonies than an arbiter of the law. There were few legal questions; the 
jury simply resolved the dispute. Although in the nineteenth century, the power of the jury 
eroded, one searches the court files of Missoula County in vain for much legal argument. Dr. 
Hall notes that in the eighteenth century, instructions to the jury were "informal and 
nontechnical."*^® In Stephens day, counsel proposed jury instructions as they do today, and 
sought every advantage in them. In Cvrus McWhirk and William McWhirk vs. F L 
Worden and C. P. Higgins, plaintifis alleged that the defendants were the owners of a mill on 
the bank of the Missoula River (now the Clark Fork) and were in possession of a certain ditch
without any act of the plaintiff or the person to 
whom the security was given, become valueless..."
Section 205 of Chapter 18 empowers a judge to issue a prejudgment writ when: "(1) 
he has received the affidavit described in 27-18-202; (2) he has approved the undertaking 
required in 27-18-204; and (3) the party seeking attachment has made a prima facie showing: 
(a) in the case of real property, of his right to attachment and the necessity for seizure; (b) in 
the case of personal property: (i) of his right to attachment and the necessity for seizure at a 
show cause hearing before the court with at least 3 days' notice to the defendant...or (ii) of 
his right to attachment and the necessity for seizure and that the delay caused by notice and 
a hearing would seriously impair the remedy sought by the person seeking possession. 
Evidence of such impairment must be presented in open court, and the court must set forth 
with specificity the reasons why such delay would seriously impair the remedy sought by the 
person seeking attachment."
*̂ ®Hall, The Magic Mirror. 107.
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which "diverted waters from rattlesnake creek" and "allowed the said ditch to be out of 
repair..so as to overflow the plaintiffs land." Any flooding o f the McWhirks* land was a 
serious offense. They had surrounded their East Front Street cabin with a large vegetable and 
flower garden, which was a landmark for travelers entering the Missoula Valley from the east, 
and it is to their efforts that the appellation "the Garden City," to which Missoulians still cling, 
can be traced."' The Defendants asserted that the plaintiffs' agents placed obstructions in the 
ditch, causing the overflow. Stephens, for the Plaintiffs, submitted jury instructions, in part, 
as follows;
The jury are instructed that if defendants owned or used a ditch which passed 
over the land of plaintiffs, he was bound to use it so as not to injure plaintiffs 
lands and this irrespective of the question as to which had the older right or 
title, and if through any fault or neglect of defendant in not properly managing 
or keeping his ditch in repair, the water overflowed or broke through or 
seeped through the banks and destroyed or damaged the land of plaintiffs or 
any goods or property plaintiffs had thereon defendant would be liable for 
such injury."^
In short, the plaintiffs alleged negligence. The Defendants of course submitted their own set
of proposed instructions, asking that any contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff
serve as a complete bar to recovery:
If the jury believe from the evidence the plaintiffs by negligence or 
carelessness in any manner or to any extent contributed to the production of 
the injury they will find this verdict for the defendants.*"
'"Koelbel, 33. 
*"3, 0596. 
*"3, 0592.
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The jury, incidentally, brought in a verdict for the defense.* '̂* It is difficult to say whether or 
not these instructions were, in Hall's words, informal and nontechnical, but it can be said for 
a fact that they were much, much shorter than what one could expect today. In addition, no 
statutory or decisional authority was submitted in support of the proposed instructions. The 
jury received a few general common law principles to guide the verdict. Judges did not 
attempt to micro-manage (as they often do today.) If the jury had less than the near absolute 
authority of the ancient courts, they had more than they do today. Thus, in many of its 
fundamentals, the Anglo-Saxon machinery was still alive in Stephens' Missoula.
As the Germanic tribes had no evolved civil procedure before trial, however, any 
discussion of such found in Stephens' cases must be viewed apart from these older streams 
of influence. One procedural device found in abundance in Missoula County in the 1870's 
was the demurrer.^^  ̂ Defendants demurred so often that the purpose must usually have been 
vexatious. Stephens demurred as often as anyone. For example, in Edward St. Germain vs. 
Brunnet & Ladaux. he alleged in a brief paragraph that "the complaint does not state facts 
sufficient to constitute a cause of action.""^ Against a plaintiff, Neptune Lynch, who sought 
to foreclose upon a chattel mortgage executed by defendants Wiles and Decker, Stephens was 
a bit more prolific:
...the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
1343, 0588.
A demurrer is a response to a complaint (or answer) which basically says: "Even if I 
were to admit everything you have said, you still have not offered a legally adequate grievance 
(or answer)." In a way, it says: "so what?".
0890.
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That the complaint is ambiguous uncertain and unintelligible in this
That it does not appear by the complaint whether the action is brought for the 
payment of certain promissory notes therein stated above or the foreclosure 
of a certain mortgage therein stated above, or for both.^^’
Demurrers are now disfavored, even where theyare still allowed. In California, some practice
manualsadvise counsel to append a declaration to a demurrer detailing efforts to resolve the
matter informally with the opponent.
Depositions were taken in Stephens day, but not as a matter of course. They occurred
in the more protracted cases. In McWhirk vs. Worden and Higgins. Stephens noticed the
deposition of a witness as follows;
The above named DeAs, or their attorney A.H. Mayhew will hereby take 
notice that the plffs will take the deposition of A. Hilly as a witness for plffs 
in the above cause on the 15 day of May 1873 at the office of Thos. M 
(illegible) Justice of the Peace in the Town of Missoula at one P. M. of that 
clay\
This is substantially the language used today. Records of the depositions are difficult to find. 
One, in Joseph Lorraine et. al. vs George M. Windes. suggests that narrative questions"^ 
were more in use than one would expect today, even in deposition ("State what you know 
concerning a charge against you for the sum of $126 46/100 for goods sold and delivered to 
you by Plaintiffs as alleged in this complaint")."^ TWs suggests either less skill on the part
"^2, 1083.
"*3, 0572.
^^^"Narrative" questions are questions which invite a long answer. They are improper at 
trial. WTiile allowÂIe in deposition, attorneys oAen prefer to avoid giving the witness a great 
deal of latitude.
1403, 1274-5.
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of the lawyers, or that the lawyers anticipated less skillful witnesses.
While court records do not contain any documentation of informal conferences and
efiforts at settlement, they do confirm that a great many cases were settled prior to trial. The
stipulation in Mil green vs. Doyle was typical:
...That for and in consideration of the Sum of one thousand dollars in hand 
paid by the parties of the second part the receipt whereof is hereby 
acknowledge. The party of the first part does hereby agree to dismiss a suit 
at law he did commence against the parties of the second part for the recovery 
of the possession of mining claim fifty-nine (59)...*^^
Stephens, representing the plaintiff, had a stipulated dismissal entered, on condition of
payment of all costs in fifteen days, in the case of J. H. Hopkins vs. Adam Rutherford et. al."^
Always the detail man, he also remembered to enter a satisfaction of judgment in the
Lamoureaux matter after receipt of a note for $125.00."^ Admittedly, a better practice would
have been to withhold the satisfaction until the note was paid, for if the note were not in fact
paid, the case would have had to have been reopened.
The procedure in use in Missoula County shared some of the devices employed during
German pre-history. These included, principally, the reliance upon oaths and the immediate
concern with possession. Missoula County also utilized a great body of procedure which is
still in use, including, by way of overview, the entire pattern of a court case. Still, the frontier
and modern proceedings possess attitudinal differences from one another. In frontier
Missoula the courts aimed to get everything gathered up (for example, the subject matter) and
0156. 
0212 . 
"^2, 1068.
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get the case resolved. In modem courts, resolution is approached with a greater hesitancy.
Legal procedure is not a subject likely to stir the passions of the populace. But 
procedure is much more than a body of dry legal strictures. Through procedures one can 
perceive the real workings of the law and what it seeks to achieve. Beyond that, one can 
trace the treads of continuity between historical periods, as well as the accumulated changes. 
It is often forgotten that the "Bill of Rights," which Americans cherish so devotedly, and 
which seems to stand for what is best about the United States, is largely a body of mandated 
procedure and procedural restrictions.
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Chapter 4. The Early Practice: The Substance of the Causes
A survey of clearly identifiable causes indicates that Stephens, in the first ten years of
his practice in Missoula County, appeared in better than five times as many commercial
(including consumer) disputes as land disputes, a statistic confirming that Missoula in its
earliest days was essentially what it remains today: a trading center for Western Montana.
Stephens' bountifiil harvest of litigation also underscores how little the changes that were
affecting the legal profession in urban areas, particularly the rise of the office lawyer, the
"counselor" to industry, touched an outpost like Missoula.
Notwithstanding the prevalence of commercial actions, there was no shortage of
mining disputes. Milgreen vs. Doyle, was typical. The plaintiff expressed a typical injury, that
he had been ejected fi'om his claim, and that the interlopers were busy extracting the gold.
The above named plaintiff complains of the above named defendants that... he 
is and was the owner and was on or about the 15th day of November 1870 in 
lawful undisturbed and peaceable possession under the mining laws of Barretts 
[?] the following described property [lengthy description]
...That on or about 14 day of nov 1870 defendants entered into and ousted 
this plaintiff therefrom and has ever since withheld and does now withhold the 
possession of the premises from this plaintiff and use the same for their own 
purposes...
The land had no value beyond its treasure of ore. As it was being looted and was becoming 
valueless before the plaintiffs eyes, Stephens requested an injunction:
[if the defendants continue] to extract the gold or other minerals therefrom the
i^^Hall, 212.
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injury to this plaintiff will be irreparable and said mining claim will [illegible] 
a mass of rubbish and the plaintiff will be remediless at law for all of the Said 
defendants are wholly insolvent...
Wherefore plaintiff prays judgment... for the possession of said mining ground 
and for the sum of four hundred Dollars damages up to the time o f the 
commencement of this action and for the Sum of fifty Dollars per day 
damages (thereafter)... and that during the pendency of this suit the defendants 
their employees and agents and all persons in privity with them be enjoined 
and restrained from working the said mining claim or digging or removing the 
sand and ground thereof or extracting the mineral substances therefrom or in 
any manner molesting or interfering with the same and that at the trial of this 
cause the same be made perpetual... '̂*®
An interesting aspect of this case was that it was premised upon a "miner's code." 
Friedman has described these codes as "little bodies of law, adopted as binding customs in 
Western mining camps." These ad hoc law codes set up "rough but workable rules and 
processes, for recording claims, for deciding whose claim was first, for settling disputes 
among claimants, and for enforcing decisions of miners' courts. Raymond August's Ph. 
D. dissertation traced the miners' codes to the Spanish Mining Code. While no 
incontrovertible evidence of adoption exists, August persuasively contended that Mexican and 
Chilean miners poured into the California fields before news of the strike arrived in the United 
States. These hispanic miners brought the law that they knew with them. Arriving Americans 
found the law entirely serviceable. From California, the miners' codes moved eastward.
‘"‘̂ 2, 025-7, 22-3 (pages out of sequence in the transcript). Modem practitioners would 
readily recognize the elements of injunctive relief, specifically that "irreparable damage" 
would ensue if the injunction is not granted, and that a judgment for money would be 
inadequate (here, because of the defendant's insolvency).
‘̂^Friedman, 319.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
65
following the strikes/'*^ The codes became a sort of particularized common law for mining 
camps all over the Western United States, including M o n t a n a . I n  1860, the Colorado 
territorial legislature had expressly ratified the decisions of these courts (although it seems 
they should have withstood attack in any event, as they were really awards of binding 
arbitration.) '̂*®
In another case premised upon miners’ law, Stephens represented A. W. Demers in 
his suit against Eudjor Jencotte, Henry Romaine, and George Ferault. Demers alleged that 
he had a one-fourth interest as a tenant in common with the defendants in certain mining 
properties "in San Louis nnning districts all within Missoula County Montana Territory under 
the mining laws thereof; and for a property in the "Eurtache (?) mining district Missoula 
County Montana Territory under the mining laws thereof"*^® Although the details are 
significantly different, the thrust of Demers' Complaint is similar to Doyle's: he had been 
expelled from his claim (here by co-owners), and the wrongdoers were urgently removing 
everything of value (the gold) from the claim. Stephens wrote:
That on the 13th day of April aforesaid (1876) the said plaintiff came into and
'̂’’Raymond S. August, Law in the American West: A History of its Origins and its 
Dissemination. Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Idaho, 1987.
*'‘*Malone, Reeder, and Lang, 79; Dan Cushman, Montana^the Gold Frontier. (Great 
Falls: Stay Away, Joe Publishers, 1973), 68.
Similarly, the laws of the Barrett District were at least indirectly enforceable as 
evidences of commercial practices.
"The Mining Laws of the Barrett District Cedar Creek" were recorded in Missoula 
County on April 1, 1870(1,1226-1232).
***^Tenancy in Common is a type of joint ownership in which each owner holds an 
undivided interest in property.
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upon the said mining claims for the purpose of representing and working his 
interest thereon with said defendants. That said defendants would not 
recognize his title to the interest in the claims...but denied his title and 
forcibly prevented him from working thereon...That said defendants would 
give plaintiff no account of the gold extracted.
The complaint also alleged that once the claims were exhausted the defendants proposed to
go to the Black Hills where they would be beyond the reach of the Montana court. Thus, the
situation required an immediate remedy. In addition to damages, Stephens asked for the
appointment of a receiver to protect the plaintiffs interest.^®  ̂ Accordingly, on May 4, 1876,
in chambers. Judge Knowles appointed Hank Nightengale, of Nine Mile Creek, receiver "to
take charge of and control the plaintiffs interest in the mining claims in plaintiffs complaint."
Knowles ordered Nightengale to "faithfully perform and discharge the duties of such trust"
and to post bond/^^
The issuance of an injunction (as in Milgreen) and the appointment of a receiver 
served much the same purpose—to stop the defendants from getting possession of the 
plaintiffs gold. The injunction in Milgreen halted mining. The receivership in Demers 
permitted mining to continue, but the preserved the plaintiffs alleged share. In Milgreen, 
where outsiders had expelled the plaintiff, injunction was the better remedy. Milgreen wanted 
mining stopped altogether until he was restored to possession. In Demers, however, the 
defendants had a right to be there and to mine the claim, because they were co-owners. They
1846-51.
1827, 1850-52. A "receiver" is a person appointed by the court to take possession 
of and preserve property or funds of another, pending the outcome of litigation.
i»4. 1829-1830.
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had no right, however, to expropriate the Demers' share. Hence a receivership, pursuant to 
which a receiver would take possession of, sequester, and preserve Demers' share, provided 
the appropriate remedy. The Demers defendants could work the claim twenty-four hours a 
day; and under the aegis of the receiver, Demers' could get his share without getting his hands 
dirty.
In Hopkins v. Rutherford, an action for Breach of Contract, the plaintiff alleged an 
agreement under which Rutherford would work Hopkin s claim, and pay him one third of the 
take. Apparently, even in the rough and tumble mining districts, labor and capital inexorably 
found their places.
Promissory notes occupied the courts far more often than actions arising from
disputed mining claims. The prevalence of notes is explained by the fact that a promissory
note was often the only document produced to provide evidence of a credit transaction.
Lawsuits against delinquent commercial customers and consumers often stated simply that
a note had been made by the defendant and had become past due under its terms. A simple
note, then, served where today a more elaborate contract might be expected. This is easy to
understand. The language of a promissory note was short, handy, self-explanatory, and
sufficient to document the existence of the debt. For example, Thomas Foley sued John
Hennessey upon a note in writing which said;
I the undersigned promise to pay the bearer Thomas Foley or order the sum 
of the sum of Ten [?] dollars on the 20th day of October 1871 which I the 
undersigned John Hennessey promise to pay for value received from [?] Foley 
which are the improvements on the Sullivan and Shea Ranch so called with 
one breaking plough giving my hand and name John Hennessey.,..^*'*
1542, 2196.
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Thus Hennessey was a contractor, engaged to improve agricultural real estate. The 
agreement was memorialized as a note, instead of, as we would now expect, a contract.
Likewise, merchants often extended credit while requiring the customer to execute 
a note which recited only "for value received." At the same time, the same customer's ledger 
might identify a portion o f the balance not otherwise documented, requiring the plaintiff to 
separate his account into two separate causes of action; that is, to sue on one delinquent 
balance on one theory (default upon the note) and another upon a different theory (for the 
value of the goods). In the first, the evidence would be the note, in the second, the value of 
the goods. The distinction may seem elusive to lay readers, but it determined the evidence 
the attorney had to adduce. If the distinction was lost on the lawyer, he might lose the case. 
For example, when Stephens represented R. D. Leggett in a suit against John C. McIntosh, 
he alleged:
That on the 1st day of June 1869 the said Defendant at the County of Deer 
Lodge made executed and delivered to this plaintiff his certain promissory 
Note in writing by which said Defendant promised to pay this plff for value 
received the Sum of $68 40/100 dollars with interest thereon at the rate of 5 
per cent per month fi'om date until paid...[the note is then replicated in full]
Plaintiff further alleges as a further and Separate Cause of Action that the said 
defendant in the year 1870 became indebted to him in the Sum of $58.00 for 
goods wares and merchandize sold and delivered to the said Defendant by the 
said plaintiff at the County of Deer Lodge MT. at his the said defendant's 
special instance and request...^®*
The first cause of action was on the note. For the second, Stephens was forced to plead a
‘” 3, 0494-6.
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common count for goods sold and delivered As to the second count, the plaintiff was 
probably chagrined that he had to forego interest accruing at five per cent per month, and 
instead settle for the legal rate of ten per cent per year. Perhaps, as a good lawyer, Stephens 
utilized the opportunity to give his client a brief lecture on the wisdom of written instruments.
T. J. Demers neglected to specify an interest rate on a thirty day note made by 
Clement Lamoureaux in the face amount of $ 139.24. Stephens could therefore ask only for 
legal interest in the suit.^*  ̂ As to this omission, any admonitions Stephens proffered should 
have been given lightly. He himself could ask only for the legal rate when he pursued D. K. 
Butler, after Butler defaulted upon a one hundred dollar note in Stephens' favor.**®
If creditors were cryptic about the details of the consideration for the debt, they were 
particular about the details of repayment. Notes unfailingly established the due date and, 
usually, the interest rates with precision. Further, they particularized the kind and quality of 
money to be received in payment. The note upon which James Manning sued D. K Butler, 
Ben [?] Kennedy, E. D Barron, Nicholas Barron and James Hayes, in the face amount of 
$2,000.00, specified that payment was to be remitted in "clean Bankable gold dust or coin."**® 
Stephens represented Daniel. J Welch against Henry Dunkhem in a suit upon a note "payable
**®The "common counts" are actions alleging that some value or benefit was conferred by 
the plaintiff to the defendant and that remuneration (being the reasonable value of the goods 
or services conferred) is due.
**’2, 0979-81.
***4, 2423.
*̂ ®2, 1028-30.
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only in Gold coin o f the United States of America.
Stephens always carefully computed the interest so that the terms of the note clearly 
supported the amounts claimed in the prayer. He represented Hugh Byron against David 
Cetchan and John M. Barron in an action to collect upon a note in the face amount of 
$500.00. Although the note was past due, the defendants had made a thirteen dollar eighty- 
five cent payment. Stephens dutifully asked for interest (two per cent per month) on the sum 
of $500.00 until March 15, 1872—the date of the payment—and thereafter for interest on 
$486.15 only.
Secured notes were common as well. Neptune Lynch complained when F. B Decker 
and David Pattee‘® defaulted upon a series of promissory notes, all executed on August 7, 
1872 for a cumulative sum of $2,547.97. After setting forth the notes, Stephens, representing 
the plaintiff, alleged that the defendants, concurrently with the making of the notes, had 
delivered a certain Indenture of Mortgage, encumbering "One Steam Saw Mill with steam 
engine, hooks.. .(?), files, and tools of every description belonging, or in anyway appertaining 
to the Said Saw Mill." The Indenture, in turn, had been "duly recorded as a mortgage in the 
office o f the clerk of the County of Missoula on the 7th day of Aug 1870 in Book A of 
Mortgages at page 216."^^  ̂ Untroubled by the potential conflict of interest, Stephens
^̂ "3, 1366.
^"3, 0478-81.
^^^Pattee was one of the founders of Missoula and was involved in numerous business 
ventures during the 1870's. Koelbel, Missoula the Way it Was. 31.
1633̂  1297-1300. The case was settled and dismissed (3, 1250).
Most states have since adopted the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code
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represented Daniel J. Welch when he foreclosed upon a chattel mortgage given by the same
Neptune Lynch, this securing a $500.00 note (bearing interest at 4% per month) with
Fifty-four head of stock that is to say, fourteen (14) head of [?] Cows branded 
with a figure two (2) on the left Hip; also: Six two year old Cows without 
[?)] also, fourteen (14) head of two year old steers and heifers all branded 
with a circled 2 thus. . .on the left side; also nine (9) calves belonging to the 
fourteen (14) head of aged cows; also, four (4) cows with three (3) 
calves...also two (2) yoke of work oxen...Which mortgage was duly 
acknowledged...and...afterwards duly recorded on the 9th day of November 
1872 in Book A of Mortgages Page 231. . .^^
If anything, modem chattel mortgages are less specific.
Since actions that one would expect to be plead in contract were so often transposed
into notes, actions for breach were rare. They usually arose when a disappointed party to a
vague agreement managed to find a lawyer to champion his cause. When Nathaniel Layne
and John Crutchfield felt aggrieved by L M Lafontaine and Louis Celaimant, the firm of
Mayhew & McMurtry filed the complaint on their behalf. The lawyers began tentatively
enough, claiming: "[t]hat heretofore to wit on the 15th day of February 1871 said defendants
made and entered into a contract with plaintiffs which said contract was in substance as
follows." From there the lawyers unfolded a tale which required determination to
comprehend. The defendants agreed that if the plaintiffs would construct a sawmill and have
it ready for machinery to be installed by June 1, 1871, they, the defendants, "would purchase
and furnish a saw...and all other necessary machinery to complete the said mill for cutting
lumber." Additionally, defendants agreed to provide clothing and provisions for the plaintiffs
("UCC"). Under the UCC, Security interests in personal property are perfected on a form 
UCC-1, and registered with the Secretary of State.
«̂̂ 3, 1284-5.
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wMle they were constructing the mill. For their part, the plaintiffs were to pay for part of the 
machinery and support by supplying defendants with four hundred dollars worth of lumber. 
"The balance," not specified as to amount or otherwise defined at all, "plaintiffs were to pay 
when they could." The plaintiffs spent all of their money erecting the mill "and also became 
involved in debts contracted for the same purpose." Beyond this, they said only that they had 
"suffered great damage" and prayed judgment in the amount of fifteen hundred dollars and 
costs. Stephens appeared for the defense. The court file gives no hint of the result, but that 
fact suggests that the plaintiffs' troubles did not end when they had finally finished the 
complaint, as questionable causes often die on the vine.*̂ ®
In another matter, Michael Martin and William Stevens each maintained accounts for 
moneys owing by one to the other. The arrangement survived for three years, but on May 
7, 1872 they held a meeting to net the offsets and settle any remaining balance. Martin 
alleged that although it had been determined that Stevens owed him $660.50, Stevens had 
failed to pay. William J. Stephens represented the plaintiff, claiming that the settlement 
agreement had been breached, and won a judgment for $682.48, inclusive of costs.
When there was no written contract, lawyers then did what they do now; plead the 
common count. Stephens represented Hugh McMahon against Larry Keatory [?]. In the 
complaint, Stephens alleged that McMahon had worked four months and twenty-two days 
at the defendant's farm in the Bitter Root valley and that $218.66 was due and owing from 
the defendant for "work done and performed for the said defendant at his the said defendant's
i^^2, 1452-4. 
0455-6.
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special instance and request.
Stephens represented E.J. Bonner and R. A. Eddy "comprising the firm of R. A & 
Co." against Moses Reeves, Louis Brown, and Louis Beaufire (?), alleging that the defendant. 
Reeves, had become indebted in the sum of "fourteen hundred sixty nine dollars and thirty six 
cents for goods wares and merchandise sold and delivered." From there, Stephens skillfully 
sought to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of real estate from Reeves to the other 
defendants:
Plaintiff further alleges that in the year 1871 he the said defendant Reeves was 
the owner of property in the County of Missoula Montana of about the value 
o f $10,000 dollars. That the said property would have been more than 
sufficient to pay all his debts including plaintiffs demand. That on or about 
the 16th day of May 1871 the said defendant Reeves disposed of all the said 
property to one Louis Brown and Louis Beaufire (?) and others to whom he 
was not indebted more than three or four hundred dollars and from whom he 
received no consideration other that the said amount...
That the said Brown and Beaufire (?) conspired with the said defendant 
Reeves in order to aid the said Reeves to cheat his creditors and particularly 
this plaintiff...
Wherefore plaintiff prays judgment against the said defendant Reeves for the 
said sum...and that the sale made to the said Brown and Beaufire (?) be set 
aside as fraudulent...
The case was voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiffs.
Torts to the person were rare in Missoula County. James W. Ely Jr.'s study of
Andrew Jackson's legal career found a paucity of torts on the North Carolina and Tennessee
^̂ ’3, 0511-3. Stephens obtained a default judgment. A modern lawyer would have plead 
a verbal contract and an "implied in fact" contract in addition to the common count.
0598-60.
0639
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frontiers as well, although defamation was a frequent source of litigation in a region where 
reputation was treasured/’® Missoula County residents did not trouble their attorneys about 
affronts to their honor, but trespasses to land were another matter. For example, as 
mentioned earlier, Cyrus and William McWhirk sued Worden and Higgins for allegedly 
flooding their land.
Water rights, always a passionate issue in the American West, were aggressively 
litigated in Missoula County. C C O'Keefe complained against John Roland that the latter 
had "wrongfully and unlawfully diverted and took and carried away the waters of the said 
stream by means of artificial canals and ditches."”  ̂ Stephens brought suit on behalf of 
Michael Gannon against Thomas Foley. Stephens alleged that Foley had "wantonly, wilfiilly 
and maliciously...destroyed a No. 8 Sewing Machine o f Wheeler and Wilson manufacture" 
and other personal property belonging to Gannon. As a result, Gannon lost his ability to 
support his family, "giving him great distress and anxiety of mind rendering his life 
burdensome... all of which distressed (the plaintiffs) mind to an extreme degree." The prayer 
asked for the value of the destroyed property ($245.00), plus $500.00 for the "distress, 
discouragement, anxiety and general unhappiness."*”  The Court instructed the jury that it 
m i^ t award damages for the value of the destroyed property, for loss of use thereof, and for 
"punitive" damages if it, the jury, determined that the defendant acted "wilfully or 
maliciously." The Court issued no instructions as to any general (non-economic) damages
*’®Ely, "The Legal Practice o f Andrew Jackson," 428. 
*’*2, 0931,2.
*” 5, 1928-30.
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for emotional distress, effectively denying the claim as a matter of law. Emotional injuries, 
therefore, were still considered too ethereal in frontier Missoula. The jury brought in a 
verdict for $93.00.*’  ̂ In general, the tort revolution was the better part of a century away.*’“ 
Stephens participated in other cases which required a surprising level of sophistication. 
In 1874, voters repudiated a school tax. The frustrated school board hastily had held another 
election upon doubtful authority. The tax passed at the subsequent election. The Board's 
action outraged a number of influential citizens. Stephens and W. C. McCormick represented 
F. L. Worden, John Higgins, D. J.l Simmons, H McFarland and E. Rende "on their own 
behaH  ̂and on behalf of aU other taxable inhabitants of School District No. 3" against W. G 
Edwards, the County Treasurer and tax collector. The "homespun" quality of some of the 
other pleadings quoted herein is utterly absent in the seven page complaint Stephens and 
McCormick crafted. A part-time lawyer, McCormick devoted most of his attention to real 
estate, the town newspaper (The Missoula Pioneer, which he had owned for a while), and his 
mill at Fort Owen, which he had bought at the end of 1872. Stephens, on the other hand, was 
the most active lawyer in the community. Unlike many of his adversaries, including 
McCormick, he never blurted his facts when drafting a pleading; his counts, even when
^̂ 5̂, 1955-7. Most tort damages seek to compensate the victim for the harm suffered, as, 
for example, Gannon was to be compensated for the value of his property which had been 
wrongfully destroyed, and for the money he would have made but for its destruction. 
"Punitive" or "exemplary" damages, however, are awarded to punish the wrongdoer, not to 
compensate the victim. Punitive damages are only awarded where the jury is satisfied that 
the wrongdoer's behavior was intentional, and not merely careless.
’̂ '̂The Missoula firm of Garlington, Lohn, and Robinson claims to be a successor to the 
practice W. J. Stephens began in Missoula. It is now the largest and perhaps the most 
prestigious in Western Montana. Most of their business is insurance defense.
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propounding the most pedestrian grievance, were always well crafted. While it is not clear 
that Stephens could claim credit for the quality of the pleading, he probably deserved it. He 
was certainly much the superior lawyer. All of that aside, the school tax case was probably 
Missoula County's first class action lawsuit.^’® The Court set a hearing on the requested 
injunction on December 8, 1874. That is the last entry in the file.^ ’̂
Stephens also handled an occasional divorce. Cecile Stone v. William Stone, as with 
most divorces in Missoula County, alleged desertion.^’* While there was no "no fault" divorce 
in Missoula County, policy considerations, that is, the focus of the court's concern, did not 
differ from what one would expect today.*’® Sophia Sparanburg vs. George William
*’®Stephens and McCormick were often adversaries. In Thos. M Pomerov vs. John 
Brown. J. A. Nicholsand W. J. McCormick. McCormick, represented all defendants (that is, 
including himself.) Stephens represented the plaintiff. McCormick filed a demurrer, but 
neglected to serve Stephens. Stephens promptly obtained the defendants' default, as no 
responsive pleading and been duly filed and served. Seeking to set aside the default, 
McCormick filed an aflSdavit insisting that he and Stephens had adopted a "rule" of "accepting 
service and waiving copies," which meant that a party would simply review a pleading, 
motion, or response for content and waive receipt of a written out copy. The very next day, 
June 14, 1871, Stephens filed a counter-affidavit denying that there had been any such "rule," 
and explaining to the court that a custom existed amongst County lawyers where, upon 
request, copies were waived, and there had in this instance been no such request. Stephens 
style, then, was rigorous, even punctilious, especially when compared with McCormick, who 
used words like "rule" with a sloppiness unbefitting a lawyer.
*’®4, 1698-1705.
*” 4, 1107.
*’*1,414-5.
*’®Many modem jurisdictions have sought to make divorces easier to obtain and less 
acrimonious by the adoption of so-called "no fault" statutes. Before no fault, a party sued for 
divorce, alleging some reprehensible conduct on the part of the other spouse, such as 
desertion, adultery, etc. In a no fault jurisdiction, the petitioner usually alleges only that 
"irreconcilable differences" have arisen which are "irremediable." There is no blame. The
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SpM^byrg, while outside the time parameters of the chapter, illustrated much about divorce
in nineteenth century Missoula, because it was seriously contested, because it contained
allegations and cross-allegations which ring familiar to the modem reader, because there was
a dispute as to custody of the three children, and because it went to trial. Sophia Sparanburg,
through her attorneys Stephens and Bickford, alleged that
that the defendant has treated her in a cruel and inhuman manner.. that on the 
23 rd day of December 1879, the defendant...by threats of violence drove the 
plaintiff from the shelter of her house and would not for a number of hours 
allow her to return, she was exposed to cold and inclement weather...
That upon divers occasions, and so frequently as to render the life of plaintiff 
unendurable and miserable...the defendant used violent, abusive, and 
scandalous language and accused the plaintiff of conjugal infidelity and 
adultery without any cause therefore...
...the plaintiff was in fear of great bodily harm and did at divers times 
sustain...bodily injury being struck and beaten by defendant...
That in the month of February 1884. .. the defendant came to his house in an 
intoxicated and drunken condition, and by using violent and abusive language 
kept the plaintiff awake all night...the plaintiffs life was, and has been 
rendered miserable by the conduct of the defendant...and this plaintiff is 
informed and believes,"" [that the defendant] committed adultery with lude 
[sic] women in the town of Missoula.
Apparently, the very last straw for Mrs. Sparanburg was when her husband placed a 
legal notice in the "Weekly Mlssoulian" disclaiming any responsibility "for any bills contracted 
by Mrs. Sophia Sparanburg." Defendant George William Sparanburg filed his answer, 
specifically denying all of the misconduct his wife had alleged, except for the legal notice.
petitioner is saying little more than "I do not want to be married anymore."
**"The use of the phrase "informed and believes" means that the belief is based on hearsay, 
not personal knowledge. The phrase is frequently used in modem pleadings.
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This notice, he said, occurred because
defendant was mining and operating a mill (in Lolo). ..(and) he leased said mill 
to other parties and made his arrangements to move his family to Missoula 
when the plaintiflF declined to come and told this defendant that she would not 
live in town and that she would not live with him any more and that she was 
going to put this defendant in debt and break him...
Further, defendant said that he, not she, was the abused party, and that he, not she, was the
suitable custodian for the children: "that the said plaintiff is a women of violent passion and
has...abused this defendant...that (defendant) is able to maintain educate and care for said
children and...said plaintiff would not and could not." On November 17, 1885, after trial and
deliberations, jury foreman Richard Beche presented the Court with a note disclosing the
verdict:
We the Juiy find for the plaintiff and that the plaintiff is the proper person to 
have the custody of the children. We also specifically find that defendant is 
an able bodied man and can earn three dollars per day.
Accordingly, Judge Gallraill dissolved the bonds of matrimony, awarded custody of the
children to Mrs. Sparanburg, and ordered "said plaintiff have and recover of defendant for her
support and the support of said children, from and after this date the sum of one dollar per
day, for during and until said children arrived at and become of the age of sixteen years."
The parallels with modem family law proceedings are striking, particularly the primacy
of the concern for the best interests of the children, the establishment of a support schedule
based on both the earnings and the earning ability of the payor spouse, and the setting of the
support level at, roughly, half the payor spouse's "spendable income," (a modem, somewhat
fluid term meaning income remaining after due allowance for base living expenses, business
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costs, and so forth).*”
Stephens handled various other matters, and, of course, he had his own accounts to 
look after. On November 24, 1874, Stephens wrote the following note:
Marchisault
Dear Sir
Maisset [?] informed me you had funds to pay expenses of suit. My fee for 
services in the Dist. Court is $50.00.
I already informed Maisset of this when here.
Yours Truly,
W. J. Stephens
At the bottom of the page one finds the notation: "Received payment Nov. 25, 1874 WJ
Stephens by Marion."*”  Stephens was not a man to be put off. When Albert Adkins, Levi
Adkins and J. L. Mellgreen sought to avoid his fee, Stephens sued. In a complaint filed July
18, 1871, Stephens alleged that he and the Adkins had
entered into a verbal contract by which ...plaintiff was to perform legal 
services ...in the action of J. L. Mellgreen vs. Thos. Doyle et al... and the said 
defendants agreed to pay this plaintiff the Sum of $125.00 as an absolute fee 
therein and in the event of this plaintiff gaining the Suit (?) then to pay him the 
further Sum of $375.00.
The defendants, Stephens went on, settled the case outside of his knowledge. Acknowledging
the receipt of $50.00, Stephens demanded the rest—that is, what would have been due had he
tried and won the case: another $450.00. The same day, July 18, 1871, he filed an affidavit
stating that the defendants had sold their entire mining interest in Cedar Creek and "are now
on their way to the Atlantic states" and thereby obtained the issuance of an arrest warrant.
*«*10, 560-611.
*«M, 556. "Maisset" presumably was an assistant to Stephens.
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On July 19, Sheriff Pelkey returned the warrant stating: "I certify that I have served the within 
writ [?] arresting the within named defendants at Flint Creek in Deer Lodge Co." Pelkey 
itemized his costs, including $25 for "bringing prisoners." The next entry in the file, October 
18, 1871, is to the point: "Cause settled and clerk will please make that entry (signed) WJ 
Stephens.""^ Stephens was the sort of man who took his obligations seriously; and he 
expected the same. He was wise to collect his accounts aggressively, for Missoula was soon 
to encounter hard times.
The Civil Register for the period of 1870-1880 is surprisingly weighted toward the 
early years. That is, while the population continued to grow throughout the seventies, the 
litigation decreased. During the period commencing January 1, 1870 and ending December 
31, 1873, an average of 46.5 actions were filed per year in Missoula County. During the 
period commencing January 1, 1874 and ending December 31, 1879, an average of only 36.33 
actions were commenced per year (a drop off of about twenty-two per cent). For an 
explanation one must look beyond the Missoula Valley to the island of Manhattan, where Jay 
Cooke's bankruptcy had precipitated a national panic. Cooke’s casualties included the 
bankruptcy of the Northern Pacific Railroad in 1873, which dealt a crushing blow to 
Montana. Cooke's downfall also cost the Missoula National Bank, only thirty-five days old 
when the disaster occurred, over $8,000.00. It could have been worse. Only the urgent 
telegrams of cashier Ferdinand Kennett halted another three purses of gold enroute to New
183 1, 1049-1068.
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York for deposit with Jay Cooke and Company.^*^ Missoula did survive the seventies, 
however, and by the 1880s, had begun to boom again.
®̂'‘John H. Toole, Red Ribbons. A Story of Missoula and its Newspaper (Davenport, Iowa; 
Lee Enterprises, Incorporated, 1989), 6. Koelbel, 41.
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Chapter 5. The Eighties
In the eighties, Stephens' practice grew along with the town of Missoula. By 1880, 
Missoula had about 450 residents, a fifty per cent increase in ten years. The town became 
more commercial, and Stephens' practice involved bigger accounts that involved more money. 
Stephens was elected County Clerk in 1884, and took on a younger partner to assist him with 
the growing practice. Over the course of the decade, the litigation in which Stephens was 
involved became more complex, more protracted, and the industrial world intruded in the 
form of typewritten pleadings.
The text of his advertisements suggested the changes that Stephens' practice 
underwent. When he began practice in Missoula, he used the same advertising text he had 
used in Deer Lodge, with modifications.
W. J. STEPHENS 
Attorney and Counselor at Law
MISSOULA, M.T.
Will practice in all the Courts of the Territory and give 
his undivided attention to collections.^*^
The only addition to the Deer Lodge advertisement was the inclusion of a specific reference
to collection work. In Deer Lodge, his copy asserted only his willingness to present and
defend claims in court. In Missoula, he thought to add a particular willingness to pursue
debts, reflecting, no doubt, that he had relocated from a mining town to a trading center. In
the late 1870's, he again changed his advertising copy, this time more drastically. Thereafter,
*̂̂ The Missoula and Cedar Creek Pioneer. January 5, 1871, p. 1.
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the advertisement read:
W. J. STEPHENS 
Attorney and Counselor at Law 
Missoula City, Montana
Will give special attention to drawing papers for securing land claims, 
and entering lands under the Homestead, Preemption, desert land and other 
U. S. laws relating to lands.
Will secure patents for mineral lands and negotiate sales of mines; will 
also collect original and arrears of pensions under the old or recent acts of 
Congress. Conveyances and contracts carefully drawn, in addition to general 
law practice.^**
At first glance, the text, especially the first full paragraph, seemed to resurrect the 
mining town practice in Deer Lodge, But a closer analysis suggests a different interpretation. 
Established lawyers did not advertise for elite clients. Local, well-to-do clients knew the local 
lawyers and their reputations, while substantial clients from outside the area obtained 
referrals from fellow patricians within the area. "Important" clients (or "big-ticket" clients in 
modern lawyer's slang), in short, did not find their attorneys in newspaper ads.
The change occurred because, by then, Stephens possessed a larger, more established 
practice. An established lawyer either ceased print advertising, or, as with Stephens, uses it 
in a more sophisticated, targeted, manner. Stephens, by the late 1870's, had an active 
clientele. Further, those Missoulians active in commerce knew where to find him. The 
advertisements were addressed to the mass-market legal consumer whose need for legal 
services was occasional, or once, and who might have to search the newspaper to find an 
attorney. These clients might need help perfecting their homesteads, or gaining their
186e.g. The Weeklv Missoulian. June 11, 1880, p. 1.
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pensions. Such a person did not interact with those for whom the courts are an aspect of 
doing business. Even the most successful lawyer sought this type of client; after all, they 
"paid the light bills."
Andrew B. Hammond emerged as the main engine propelling Missoula's growth. As 
a young man he went to work for E. L. Bonner in the Missoula's Bonner & Welch General 
Store. Hammond ran the store aggressively. In 1876, he was made a partner, and the firm 
was styled "Eddy, Hammond & Co."'^*’ Their business soon outstripped that of Higgins and 
Worden, who had founded the settlement.
The Northern Pacific Railroad entered Montana in 1881. Naturally, the town’s 
merchants eagerly sought to bring it through Missoula. Higgins and Worden donated land 
for a depot and railroad yard. They were therefore much chagrined to learn that the Northern 
Pacific had awarded a lucrative contract for railroad ties to Eddy, Hammond & Co. The 
actual arrival of the railroad affected all Missoulians and provoked much controversy.*®* For 
Stephens, however, the advent of Eddy, Hammond & Co., and the arrival of the railroad had 
identical significances. Both meant new, deep-pocket defendants.
Stephens represented James Marsh in a suit against Edward Bonner, Richard A. Eddy, 
and Andrew B. Hammond, "doing business...under the firm name and style of Eddy 
Hammond & Co." on August 2 1882. Marsh, a subcontractor engaged to cut ties for the 
railroad, alleged that he had not been fully paid.**  ̂ Along with Walter Bickford, Stephens
*®’Richard A. Eddy was another partner. 
**®Koelbel, 57-59.
**®8, 1160-1163.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
85
took the Northern Pacific Railroad to the Justice Court of Hellgate Township, on April 29, 
1885, when James Miller complained that the Railroad refused to pay on assigned claims. 
Apparently, Miller operated a kind of frontier check cashing service, purchasing the claims 
of railroad workers and then claiming their compensation. Stephens and Bickford recovered 
$65 for their client/”  The trial record specified that Stephens and Bickford appeared for the 
plaintiff. However, if the partnership followed the expected pattern, Bickford probably 
handled the case himself.
Walter Mansur Bickford came to Montana in 1884 after having been educated at 
Maine Central Institute at Pittsfield and admitted to the Pennsylvania Bar in 1878. In the 
latter part of his career he would become an "office lawyer." As a "corporation lawyer," he 
served as vice-president of the Missoula Light and Water Company, the Missoula Street 
Railway Company, and the Western Lumber Company. He was eighteen years younger than 
Stephens, and, presumably, when he arrived in Missoula he sought work in the office of an 
older, established attorney. Coincidentally, Stephens, who had just been elected Court Clerk 
and ex-offico probate judge, needed the help of a young lawyer to keep the practice going.
This type of partnership was a paradigm for many law partnerships, then and now. 
The older, established lawyer had the connections in the community, and his time was more 
profitably spent developing and maintaining those connections, and personally serving the 
larger clients. Rather than turn away the lesser cases, he found a younger lawyer, one eager 
for any type of business, and hired him.
i” l l ,  158-167.
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Stephens and Bickford represented James McElroy upon an account s t a t e d . T h e
complaint was filed August 23, 1884, signed "W.J. Stephens W.M. Bickford Attys for
Plaintiff.”*®̂ While Stephens name appeared, his flowing handwriting did not. The manner
of appearance might have suggested some ambivalence about the partnership; McElroy was
represented by two attorneys, rather than a partnership. However, in the nineteenth century,
law partnerships were easily formed and ended. Writing of Lincoln's numerous partnership
arrangements, John P. Frank contended:
The whole partnership relation was more casual than can be readily 
understood in the twentieth century. The amount o f property jointly owned 
was trifling and there were none of the complications of accounting required 
by modem taxes and business methods. Lincoln had perhaps some seventy- 
five of these special partnership arrangements.
However startling the idea of seventy-five partnerships, Frank insisted that these were
bonafide partnerships, not ad hoc co-counsel arrangements.*®'* C. Robert Haywood described
Dodge City’s raucous bar as a "close-knit fraternity" in which "individuals opposed each other
*®*An "account stated" is one of the common counts. Briefly, it alleges that a business 
account exists and is unpaid.
*®̂ 10, 956-958.
*®̂ Frank, Lincoln as Lawyer. 16.
*®‘*Frank describes them as "standing arrangements of some duration" (16). This would 
serve as rather a loose definition of a partnership. Lawyers frequently have standing 
relationships with other firms and attorneys. To be sufficiently matured so as to be called 
"partnerships", then or now, they would have to so firmed up that had Lincoln elected to 
handle a case within the purview of the arrangement by himself, the other "partner" could sue 
and obtain the portion of the profit called for in the "arrangement."
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literally dozens of times and were partners about as often.
Stephens had appeared with numerous other Missoula County lawyers, including 
Robinson and W J. McCormick. The arrangement with Bickford, however, was the first real 
partnership he was involved in after he moved to Missoula. A degree of hesitancy at the 
outset was to be expected. Later, in 1896, when their partnership was the subject of bitter 
litigation, Stephens would testify that it was commenced June 24, 1884,^^  ̂ That date would 
have been just seven days after he proffered a demurrer on behalf of the Belknap Town and 
Improvement Company et. al. adv. Simon Marks, probably a lucrative case which he did not 
share with Bickford.*’’ In any event, shortly thereafter Stephens and Bickford appeared as 
"Stephens and Bickford," advertised as such, set up a concurrent real estate partnership, and 
eventually brought in another young lawyer on the make, Frank Higgins.
The defendants in the Belknap case were a type of party not seen in Missoula's earlier 
days—corporations. Kermit Hall has called the corporation "the form o f business that carried
*’^C. Robert Haywood, Cowtown Lawyers: Dodge City and its Attorneys. 1876-1886 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988), 62. This is certainly more casual use of the 
term than that employed by Frank (footnote 194, above.)
'’^Missoula County Case No. 1291, testimony before D. H. Ross, Esq, Referee. The firm 
of Garlington, Lohn and Robinson, which claims to be a successor (several times removed) 
of Stephens practice, reports in its firm history that the partnership began in 1883, which, as 
above, would have preceded Bickford's arrival in Missoula. The confusion is generated by 
the fact that the Register of Actions and Fee Book, District Court, Volume 2, page 139, 
reports that in the case of John Miller v. Joel Catching. Case No. 588, the defendant was 
represented by "W. J. Stephens & W. M. Bickford," and that the case commenced September 
25, 1883. Actually, Stephens undertook Catching's representation by himself on October 17, 
1883. Bickford appeared at trial on October 17, 1885.
1979, 1343 et, seq.
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the nation into the new economic age."*®* Friedman has pointed out that the corporation met 
the "overriding need ...for an efficient, trouble-free device, to aggregate capital and manage 
it in business, with limited liability and transferable shares."*®® Whether or not "trouble-free", 
or even "efficient," the corporate form proved to be a dynamo when performing the task of 
aggregating capital.
The Belknap case is also noteworthy in that it involved a suit upon a written contract, 
having a copy affixed to and made part of the complaint. Thus it had the appearance of a 
modem contract suit. Simon Marks sued the Belknap Town and Improvement Company and 
the Belknap Forwarding Company (a consortium of corporations), alleging that the 
defendants had breached an agreement under which Marks was to provide pack horses and 
mules on a per diem basis for the purpose of transporting freight and passengers. Despite 
Stephens efforts, on November 18, 1884, Marks recovered $1,240.00 and costs after a court 
tria l.^
Litigation of the 1880s demonstrates that the stakes were getting higher, reflecting the 
increased prosperity after the arrival of the Northern Pacific. Only after 1883, when 
Missoula's prosperity had been fully restored, would one find an action such as William Wood 
vs. Charles W. Berrv Sheriff of the County of Missoula M l. in which Stephens and Bickford, 
together with Smith and Abbot, complained that $10,000.00 worth of goods had been seized 
under color of law. The Wood case revealed much about changing legal practice; the file
*®*Hall, 109. 
*®®Friedman, 178. 
1382.
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itself, as well as the particulars of action, had the aura of modernity. The file contained a Bill 
of Exceptions prepared by the Court, in the person of the Hon. W. J. Galbraith. Moreover, 
the Bill was typewritten. To frame the exceptions properly, the Bill provided a summary 
record of the trial. Wood testified at the trial on June 16, 1886, describing himself as an 
"expert accountant," having followed that career for "about twenty years as a specialty" in 
Portland, Oregon. Apparently, through his routine business dealings in Portland, he became 
aware of a firm styled Savage & Reed, which owned general stores in the towns of Belknap 
and Heron, Montana. Savage & Reed owed a lot of money to Portland merchants, witnessed 
by past due notes. Although the notes aggregated to nine thousand dollars, and although 
some of them had face amounts ranging from $235.19 to $1,493.58, Wood purchased these 
notes for the proverbial song.
At trial Wood testified: "I bought them on June 4, 1884, in Portland, Oregon I paid 
one dollar for each claim...There was no understanding that I should pay anyone any part of 
what I collected; they were placed in my hands without reserve. Wood denied any 
knowledge concerning the soundness of the notes. Still, he met Reed in Portland the day he 
made the purchase, and took a train the next day, with Reed, for Heron, Montana. There, he 
used the notes to purchase the stores, getting nearly the face value of the notes in the 
exchange. For a few dollars. Wood was the proprietor of two stores and thousands of dollars 
worth of inventory. When the Sheriff sought to execute on behalf of other creditors of
^^The notes Wood listed unintentionally observe the presence Jewish entrepreneurship in 
the old northwest. Those identified are: Wasserman & Co. (no relation to this writer); 
Fleischner, Mayer & Co.; Boatman & Co.; Tanhauser & Freeman; Jacob Bros,; Goldsmith 
& Lowenberg; Allen & Lewis; M. Sellers & Co.; and W. & Co. Certainly half, and perhaps 
all, are identifiably Jewish surnames (excepting, of course, the last).
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Savage & Reed, the suit commenced. Wood obtained a verdict for $4,400.00.^*^ The verdict 
(and the denial of the motion for a new trial) was appealed to and sustained by the Supreme 
Court of the State of Montana on July 29, 1887, and, upon fiirther appeal (Writ of Error) to 
the United States Supreme Court, allowed to stand when no transcript was presented when 
the case was called for hearing. Again, the Wood case presented the kind o f case, and the 
kind of file, that one would expect to find in a commercial center, not a frontier backwater.
The story o f the practice in the 1880's is not a story of picturesque frontier cases. 
Missoula remained an isolated Western town, but its litigation fit the contours of the 
increasingly urban, commercial and affluent society that America became after the Civil War. 
Stephens and Bickford represented Darwin Loveland in a suit against The Missoula National 
Bank, alleging that the bank had failed to turn over $12,757.89 worth of notes (face value) 
on demand. The bank disputed Loveland's ownership and the suit was apparently settled. 
Stephens and Bickford dismissed the case at plaintiffs costs.^"'* The result of the was less 
important than the magnitude of the sum in question and the nature of the dispute, 
commercial notes on deposit.
Stephens and Bickford represented the firm of Bass Bros., lumber dealers, in a suit 
against Henry Lamb and John L. Sloan, after the defendants refiised to pay for lumber used 
to construct a barber shop on the north side of Front Street. As a provider of labor and 
materials, Bass Bros, was entitled to perfect a mechanic's lien, which they did do, and upon
689-865.
“̂̂ No. 174, October Term, 1891.
“̂‘10,-2055 et. seq. Some pages are not stamped.
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which Stephens and Bickford sought to foreclose.̂ ®* Here again, the litigation lacked the feel 
of the frontier. It had, instead, the familiar feel of modem litigation and its devices. No case 
in the 1870s proceeded upon a mechanic’s lien.
Thomas Adams got into trouble with the credit department of the Eddy, Hammond 
& Co., and found himself sued by The Missoula Mercantile Company, "a corporation existing 
under the laws of the territory of Montana." Eddy, Hammond & Co. had incorporated. 
Adams retained Stephens & Bickford, who joined with the Woody & Marshall, plaintiffs 
attorney, in stipulating that the matter be submitted to binding arbitration. At the arbitration, 
Adams adduced receipts evidencing that he had paid part of the claim; the decision ordered 
Adams to pay the balance. The stipulation specified that the referee's report would be entered 
as a judgement, but that did not occur. The file contained a dismissal prepared by counsel for 
Missoula Mercantile, according to which the plaintiff would bear all costs. Perhaps there 
were further negotiations after the arbitration, and perhaps as well, the store made further 
concessions to assuage the feelings of its customer. Like the preceding cases, Adams had the 
aura of modernity. It was not a dispute between neighbors, but rather a suit by a corporate 
retailer against a defaulting customer.
On February 24, 1887, Stephens and Bickford filed a complaint on behalf of "Frank 
L. Worden & Christopher P. Higgins partners under the firm name and style of Worden &
1, 1794-1797. A "mechanics lien" is a lien the law allows to a person or corporation 
which provides labor or materials to a construction project. The lien attaches to the property 
which is the site of the construction.
206 12, 991-1024.
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Co "207 was a simple matter, a suit upon a promissory note in default, made by one John 
L. Sloane in the amount of two hundred sixty-two dollars. However, Stephens must have 
been pleased, at last, to represent the town founders. The firm's reputation and experience 
undoubtedly contributed to its selection. Another reason, however, was suggested at the 
bottom of the complaint, which was signed Stephens & Bickford F. G. Higgins Attys for 
PltfFs." The firm was appearing along with another attorney, Frank G. Higgins, son of the 
town's patriarch and, not coincidentally, one of the plaintifis. Frank G Higgins, then, brought 
to the firm something besides the willingness to work that typified a young attorney; he 
brought along one of the county's biggest business clients. The complaint, and subsequent 
cases, inferred that the three were not as yet in partnership. Higgins was identified separately 
and not as a member of the firm. Perhaps Christopher P. Higgins gave the business to his son 
and suggested that he get some help from more experienced attorneys. In that way, young 
Higgins could avoid cutting into his prospective inheritance as he cut his teeth on the law.
Stephens and Bickford kept cases they acquired by themselves to themselves for some 
months. On May 13, 1887 they represented Orlin J. Luce and Samuel Slife against the Sun 
Insurance Company of San Francisco, a lle ^ g  that the carrier had failed to pay on a claim for 
the destruction by fire of an insured dwelling. The complaint affixed a copy of the policy, 
which provided some insights into the hazards of the fire insurance business of the nineteenth 
century ("Kerosine oil may be used for lights in stores and dwellings").^”* On May 24, 1887
“̂’12, 2026 et. seq. Frank Worden was improperly identified as a party. He had died 
nineteen days earlier. His executor was the proper party.
208 13, 56 et. seq.
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Stephens & Bickford again represented a Higgins' interest, this time representing Christopher 
P Higgins alone as "surviving partner of the firm o f Worden & Co." Frank G. Higgins did 
not appear on the complaint or otherwise in the file at all.̂ ®̂
On October 21, 1887 Stephens & Bickford represented the National Fire Insurance 
Company of Hartford against R. M. Morrison and C B. Mahoney, alleging in a typewritten 
pleading that Morrison and Mahoney were insurance representatives for the plaintiff who had 
failed to transmit received premiums. An out of state institutional client like this plaintiff 
would have been a feather in the cap of any lawyer. The case indicated the growing 
reputation of Stephens & Bickford. Such a client surely sought referral to a reputable local 
firm. An insurance company selling policies in the Missoula Valley would have future claims 
to defend there as well. Stephens & Bickford did not share this potentially important case 
with Frank Higgins.
On November 5, 1887, Christopher P. Higgins, again as surviving partner of Worden 
& Co., sued John Shaughnessy for defaulting on two notes. Stephens & Bickford and Frank 
G. Higgins represented Higgins. Again, the arrangement on its face is the firm of Stephens 
& Higgins as co-counsel with an individual attorney, Frank G. Higgins.^" Frank Higgins was 
admitted to the firm as a partner in March of 1888.^'^
20913, 91 ggq
*̂“13, 91 et. seq. 
^^43, 1614 et. seq.
‘̂̂ Testimony before D. H. Ross, Esq., Referee, Missoula County Case No. 1291, Stephens 
v Bickford.
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Frank Higgins was surely on board when the firm defended the Missoula Water Works 
& Milling Company and the Town of Missoula against the claim of August S cheer in 1888. 
This was a rare action for personal injury. Scheer alleged that on the night of February 6, 
1888, while walking on either Higgins or Pine (the complaint is not clear), he fell into a 
portion of a ditch which had been opened to either lay or maintmn the water pipe. Scheer said 
he injured his head and his hip and that he could not work for three weeks. He alleged that 
the water company neglected to light the hole, thereby exposing pedestrians to an 
unreasonable risk of harm. The answer submitted on behalf of the Missoula Water Works and 
Milling Company was handsomely typed. It made a marked contrast with the nearly 
unintelligible handwritten complaint George Reeves had offered on behalf of Scheer. On the 
folder enveloping the answer was stamped; "Stephens, Bickford & Higgins." After this, 
Stephens participation in the case, and the existence or non-existence of the firm itself 
becomes vague. In June of 1890, another attorney, Marshall, asked for subpoenas on the 
defendant's behalf. Then, on June 13, Bickford applied for a continuance on the grounds of 
witness unavailability. The defendant submitted proposed jury instructions on November 25, 
1890, credited as follows: "Marshall & Crutchfield & F. G. Higgins & W. M. Bickford Attys 
for Deft." The jury brought in a verdict for the defense.^^^
The story between the lines was that Stephens was retiring. He continued to practice 
and the firm of Stephens, Bickford & Higgins still existed on February 15, 1889, when it
^̂ Ângiist Scheer vs. Missoula Water Works and Milling Company, Case No. 1026. At 
this point documents are no longer identified by transcript number.
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represented the McCormick Harvesting Company in a collection action.^ '̂* In 1890, however, 
while the Scheer suit was ongoing, Stephens went to California. On November 13, 1890, he 
sued Milan Conant on a note secured by real property. In the complaint, Stephens stated, 
through his counsel, that he had mistakenly executed an affidavit indicating that the debt was 
paid, and releasing the mortgage. The complaint sets forth the affidavit, dated October 8, 
1890, and made in San Jose County, California. Stephens was not even in Montana at the 
time o f the Scheer trial; he was in California attempting to save his marriage. More 
important, a law firm styled Stephens, Matts, and Denny represented Stephens against 
Conant.^^® He was no longer associated with Bickford or Higgins.
The testimony in the suit between Stephens and Bickford, in 1896, confirmed that they 
had severed all ties, including both the law firm and the real estate business they conducted 
together, at the end of 1889. Why and how Stephens became affiliated with Matts and Denny 
is unknown. His role was probably to add the prestige of his name to the letterhead. Frank 
Higgins apparently sided with Stephens. His father, Christopher P. Higgins had died on 
October 14, 1889. Along with John R. Higgins, George C. Higgins, presumably his brothers, 
and his mother Julia P. Higgins, Frank was appointed Executor of his father's will. As the 
lawyer of the family, he probably could have selected any firm in town to represent the estate. 
When the Executors sued Maurice Holden upon a note in favor of Christopher Higgins, 
Stephens, Matts, and Denny brought the complaint.
^̂ ^ b e  McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. vs. Monroe Fulkerson. Case No. 1163. Here 
they represented another impressive out of state Corporation.
^^^CaseNo. 180.
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Conclusion
This concludes my efforts to portray a frontier practice in the late nineteenth century, 
and to anchor it to its many contexts. These contexts have included the Anglo-Saxon folk 
legal tradition, the elitist influences of the Inns of Court (including the professionalization of 
the bar), the emerging American legal experience in the colonies and the early republic, the 
development of a frontier commercial center, and the life of a William J. Stephens. A play 
cannot commence until the house lights are brought up. While I knew that the presentation 
of so many contexts would of necessity limit the treatment of each, I expected that each 
context would light the stage.
A study of the law practiced in frontier Missoula brings many matters to light. It 
documents the survival of basic procedural objectives from distant times, notably the use of 
oaths and security pledges to promote veracity. The study also reveals contrasts with modern 
practice. Students of frontier law are quick to point out that the frontier lawyers were skilled. 
Modem scholars eschew any overall depiction which, however affectionately, ridicules the 
old-timers. Rather, they insist that lawyers such as W. J. Stephens were, by and large, good 
lawyers. Lastly, these writers impress upon us that the frontier bar compares favorably to the 
present one.̂ ^®
But I would take this a step further. How well do contemporary lawyers compare
‘̂̂ See, for example, Elizabeth Caspar Brown, "The Bar on the Frontier: Wayne County 
1796-1830," American Journal of Legal History. Vol 14, 136-156; C. Robert Haywood, 
Cowtown I^awvers Dodge Citv and its Attorneys. (Norman: University;of Oklahoma Press, 
1988); Gordon Morris Bakken. Practicing Law in Frontier California. (Lincoln: University 
of Nebraska Press, 1991).
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with their predecessors on the frontier? Certainly modern lawyers are better trained and have 
many more tools at their disposal. In view of the objectives of the legal process, perhaps we 
are the ones who should like the comparison.
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Afterward (A Note on Technology)
By the time William J. Stephens ceased practicing law in 1890, the legal profession 
had entered the modem era. By the time he died, in 1917, case files had forever lost the 
aspect of the fi'ontier. There were no more handwritten pleadings, no more loans payable in 
gold dust. At the same time, the legal profession hardly can be said to have entered a static 
phase. The twentieth century subsequently witnessed vast changes, most particularly the tort 
and computer revolutions.
The lawyers o f Stephens' generation had their own mechanical revolution. The 
typewriter came into use during the latter part of the 1880's. One of the more interesting 
questions unexplored by this thesis is the impact of the typewriter. After the general adoption 
of typewritten documents, court files are considerably thicker. Since the typewriter made 
legal paperwork less laborious, it should come as no surprise that its advent generated more 
paper. Moreover, the thickness of the files was attributable to lengthier complaints and other 
filings, rather than new forms.
The adversarial process of litigation claims to be effective in getting at the truth. A 
mechanical breakthrough which improved the ability lawyers to wield their truth finding tools 
in litigation ought to have produced more effective litigation. But did it? That question 
deserves an exhaustive inquiry. Nothing in the denser files suggested that the public was 
being more efficiently served.
In our own day we have seen the arrival of the computer. Surely, no one could have 
thought of an instrument that fitted the administrative energies of a law office more precisely.
98
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After all, law ofiBce administration began as form accumulation and copying. Has more paper 
meant better quality? Few could seriously suggest that it has. If the mm of litigation is 
efficient, rapid, affordable, and final dispute resolution, modem litigants, once again, ought 
to envy the world of frontier Missoula.
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